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A FRAMEWORK FOR AN INFORMED STUDY
OF THE REALISTIC ROLE OF TAX IN
A DEVELOPMENT AGENDA
YARIV BRAUNER
I. INTRODUCTION: TAX INCENTIVES, DEVELOPMENT
AND THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME
The elusive quest of developing countries for economic growth' has frus-
trated many students as well as experts of development to date. Development
encompasses a variety of goals, including progress in poverty eradication,
education, health, and economic growth. When achieved contemporane-
ously these goals should work together to lift countries from poverty to
wealth-a remarkable accomplishment in our world that is characterized
more by frustration with the lack of development, the increasing gap be-
tween rich and poor countries, and failure of international initiatives to
eradicate poverty, disease and famine, than by success stories.2 The concern
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assistance; and Graham Bradfield, Paul McDaniel, Martin McMahon, the participants in
the taxation and development conference at McGill University (organized by Kimberly
Brooks, of McGill University; and Allison Christians, of the University of Wisconsin),
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This is the title of William Easterly's critically important book, The Elusive Questfor
Growth: Economists'Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics (Cambridge, Mass.:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2001) [Questfor Growth].
2 An exception to this gloomy reality is the story of the so-called Asian tigers-South Ko-
rea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. See e.g. World Bank, The East Asian Miracle:
Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). Recent
success in China and India also show promise, despite some fundamental problems in
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for development is almost universal, as is reflected particularly in the com-
mitment of many countries, organizations and people to aid programs.3 In
light of this commitment, the unsatisfactory progress is particularly frustrat-
ing.
The many reasons for current disappointment have been extensively ex-
plored, and are constantly debated in academic and other development lit-
erature, 4 yet unambiguous consensus has yet to be achieved. What is clear is
that the factors that affect the process of development (and may interfere
with it) are genuinely complex and diverse, and that progress requires pa-
tience and sophistication, based on serious extensive research. This has not,
however, been the dominant approach to date, as many players attempted to
find quick, complete, overarching, unitary and clearly articulated solutions,
or truths, based on opaque study and limited data.5 Indeed, this approach has
both countries, where many millions still live in conditions not much different than the
populations of the least developed countries. See e.g. Angus Maddison, Chinese Economic
Performance in the Long Run, 2d ed. (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2007); Arvind Pana-
gariya, India: The Emerging Giant (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); World
Bank, India: Development Policy Review, online: World Bank <http://go.worldbank.org/
ODEO 1J4A50>; Tarun Khanna, Billions ofEntrepreneurs: How China andIndia Are Re-
shaping TheirFutures and Yours (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2008); Andrea
Goldstein, Nicolas Pinaud, Helmut Reisen & Xiaobao Chen, The Rise of China and In-
dia: What's in itforAfrica ? (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2006).
3 See e.g. OECD, Development Co-operation Directorate, Aid Statistics, online: OECD
<http://www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en-2649_344471_1_1_1_1 ,00.html>.But
seeJeffrey Sachs, The End ofPoverty: Economic Possibilitiesfor Our Time (New York: Pen-
guin Press, 2006), arguing that it is not enough. Regardless of one's position about the
sufficiency of some countries commitments, it is clear that it is significant.
4 See e.g. Dani Rodrik, OneEconomics, ManyRecipes: Globalization, Institutions, andEco-
nomic Growth (NewJersey: Princeton University Press, 2008); William R. Easterly, ed.,
Reinventing Foreign Aid (New York: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2008);
Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Sachs, supra
note 3; Easterly, Questfor Growth, supra note 1; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its
Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2002); UNDP, Human Development Re-
ports, online: UNDP <http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/>; World Bank, WorldDevel-
opment Report, online: World Bank <http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/>.
5 For criticism of the current state of affairs, see William Easterly, The White Man'sBurden:
Why the West s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much ll and So Little Good (Oxford:
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proven to be ineffective.' Alternative approaches emphasize patience, a trial-
and-error, casuistic approach, transparence and constant evaluation. 7 The al-
ternatives do not mean a loss of focus,8 especially when experience suggests
that they may be the only approaches that have a chance of success. The diffi-
culty with these approaches is that they are slow, politically unattractive, and
require careful coordination to avoid having potentially worthy projects can-
celling each other's achievements. The alternative, however, is just motion
with no action,9 proven to be futile and wasteful.
This article builds on the insights of this development research to develop
a new agenda for tax incentives (and equivalent tax measures), the research of
their merits when used by developing countries, and their optimal design.
The stated goal of these incentives is to attract foreign direct investment, and
ultimately enhance economic growth and promote development.'0 Almost
all countries use such tax incentives, and business interests strongly support
and even demand their use, yet, economic research in general, and the inter-
national economic organizations in particular, have been skeptical about
their effectiveness." Tax incentives are not only ubiquitous, but also very
similar in their general structure and design, if not in the actual details, due
mainly to tax competition. 2 Another political aspect of this problem is that
Oxford University Press, 2006) [White Man's Burden]. See also Stiglitz, supra note 4;
Collier, supra note 4; William Easterly, "Can the West Save Africa?" (2009) 47Journal of
Economic Literature 373.
6 This gloomy conclusion is quite universal. See sources, supra note 5.
7 See e.g. sources, ibid.
8 See Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 2000).
9 A paraphrase on Hemingway's "Never mistake motion for action."
I0 Economic growth is the most important aspect of development and the focus of this arti-
cle.
II See below, Part II(A)(2).
12 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, "Globalziation, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis ofthe Wel-
fare State" (2000) 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573 at 1645. Practically, multinational enterprises
("MNEs") lobby and bargain forcefully for tax incentives, a practice that proves effective
with government officials convinced that the risk of losing investment if incentives are
withdrawn is significant. It is significant enough for them even in face of the opposition
to the use of tax incentives by international institutions. The political reality in target
2010
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government officials often believe or at least project confidence that they are
able to pick the "right horses:' so even if, on average, tax incentives are not ef-
fective, the incentives that they grant will be. For some, this fantasy justifies
their jobs and promotions. An obvious result (and observation) is that tax
incentives are not tailored to the very different needs of different countries,
and are not flexible and adaptive to changes in circumstances. 13
This article analyzes this phenomenon beyond simple criticism of its fail-
ures in an attempt to better understand the forces that generated it. The arti-
cle then proceeds to explore realistic avenues of advancement and the neces-
sary conditions for such advancement. The primary contributions of this ar-
ticle are: the mapping of the gaps in the research of tax incentives (assuming
that their stated goal is the true rationale for their use),'4 the demonstration
of the role of developed countries in the process of development, and the
highlighting of international tax cooperation and coordination of tax policies
as a condition for effective progress.
Part II follows this introduction with an analysis of the developing coun-
tries' side of the story. It begins with a brief note of what they actually do: the
type of tax incentives used by developing countries eyeing foreign direct in-
vestment. Then it explores why they pursue this policy. The rhetoric is pow-
erful in practice, yet is challenged by both theoretical and empirical research.
Consensus has not been reached on most of the relevant points, yet what we
do know can assist progress. We can use it to redirect the use of tax incentives
to avenues that will allow them at least a chance of success.
Progress, however, cannot happen without the support of developed
countries, where investors reside. Their role is examined in Part III, based on
a working assumption that they are interested in the development of develop-
countries, and within MNEs (negotiators of incentives "win points" internally), creates a
strong pressure to preserve tax incentives and even to gradually perk them up. A clientele
for tax incentives is developed leading to prolonging the programs well beyond the in-
tended results. David Holland & RichardJ. Vann, "Income Tax Incentives for Investment"
in Victor Thuronyi, ed., TaxLaw Design andDrafiing, vol. 2 (Washington D.C.: Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 1998) 986 at 989.
13 Including desirable and intended changes such as actual development.
14 Including other complementary tax-related measures targeting development.
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ing countries." The discussion begins with the most straightforward aspect
of the role of developed countries: making sure that the benefits granted by
developing countries do not end up in the treasury of developed countries.
The most discussed measure to achieve that result is the controversial tax
sparing provision. Currently, this provision is used mainly as a statement that
developed countries do "something."16 Tax sparing, however, is just one
measure, and presumably not the most important among a variety of meas-
ures that developed countries may take to assist developing countries on a
path toward to development. The various measures are explored together
with their limitations, and the necessary conditions for their effectiveness.
Finally, lessons from the extensive practice and study of the non-tax aspects
of foreign aid are drawn.
Part IV concludes with a realistic program for further research and ac-
tion. It emphasizes the critical role of international cooperation and coordi-
nation of tax policies, without which this whole project is probably futile. In
particular, it demonstrates some of the possibilities presented by a more edu-
cated use of tax incentives, and elaborates on the conditions that may be re-
quired to be met if redirected tax incentives' programs are to be given a
chance to succeed.
II. TAX INCENTIVES TO ATTRACT FDI FOR GROWTH
Most, if not all, countries employ tax incentives to attract foreign invest-
ment.' 7 They are willing to forgo potential revenue to secure foreign direct
15 This is based on the strong commitment to aid programs. Some powerful countries are
even committed to tax-based development support programs. See Thomas Dalsgaard,
"Japan's Corporate Income Tax-Overview and Challenges" (IMF Working Papers,
2008), online: IMF <http://www.imf.org/cxternal/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wpO870.pdf>;
Kim Brooks, "Denying Tax Sparing Provisions: Another Way for High-Income Countries
to Dictate the Tax Policy of Low-Income Countries?" (Paper presented at the annual
meeting of the Law and Society Association in Berlin, Germany, 25 July 2007), online:
All Academic <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/pl77927_index.hrml>. This does
not mean that this commitment is limitless, or sufficient (under whatever criteria one
wishes to apply), of course.
16 See e.g. Brooks, ibid.
17 See e.g. Alex Easson, Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 2004); UNCTAD, Incentives and Foreign Direct Investment, Current
2010
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investment'l.in particular because they anticipate that increased investment
will end up promoting their economic growth. Developing countries typi-
cally focus on economic growth in their quest for development. Develop-
ment in the economic sense, in simplistic terms, means that poor states be-
come richer.19 Development may mean many other things, such as improve-
ment of quality of life, life expectancy, and reduction of poverty rates.20
Nonetheless, economic development is a critical condition to development
in general, 2' and it is the main focus of this article.
Economic growth is a term of art, usually used by economists to describe
increase, or growth, in one of the common measures they use to assess the
state of an economy; measures such as national income or gross domestic
product ("GDP"). This article usually refers to growth in terms of GDP or
real income per capita, which are typical measures of growth in the economic
literature.22 Economic growth (or "growth") does not guarantee develop-
ment, yet it is a necessary condition for it, and therefore essentially every
country in the world seeks certain growth targets and uses policy measures to
achieve them. Tax incentives are just one of these measures. This section pro-
ceeds to explore what countries do by describing tax incentives programs in
use. It then turns to analyze why countries do what they do; to assess
Studies, Series A, No. 30 (New York: United Nations, 1996) [FDI]; Holland &Vann, su-
pra note 12.
18 Foreign direct investment (often abbreviated "FD") is an investment in a company lo-
cated in a foreign country (to the investor), to serve the business interests of the investor,
often a corporation. In order for the investment to be "direct" it needs to be substantial
and typically directed at fixed assets in the target country, such as factory, equipment, etc.
Normally, however, percentage ownership is used to distinguish direct from indirect, or
.portfolio" investment-typically at least 10% vote or value.
19 See e.g. Benjamin Powell, Making Poor Nations Rich: Entrepreneurship and the Process of
Economic Development (California: Stanford University Press, 2007).
20 See UNDP, Human Development Index, online: UNDP <http://hdr.undp.org/en/
statistics/indices/hdi/>.
21 In the words of Professor Collier: "Growth is not a cure-all, but the lack of growth is a
kill-all." See Collier, supra note 4 at 190.
22 Elhanan Helpman, The Mystery ofEconomic Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 2004) at 1.
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whether, and under what conditions or circumstances, currently-used pro-
grams have a chance of success in terms of economic growth.
A. WHAT Do DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Do?
1. TAx INCENTIVES
Developing countries use a large variety of tax incentives, the comprehensive
review of which is beyond the scope of this article.23 Instead, this section re-
views the basic features and the intent behind incentives that generally fall
into three basic types: rate reducing, tax base eroding, and special zones, only
to the extent required for an assessment of their effectiveness and contribu-
tion to growth.
The first and most straight-forward type of tax incentives merely reduce
the tax rates that investors face in target countries. Tax holidays are possibly
the most common form of such (or any other) tax incentives.24 A tax holiday
simply grants investors exemption (or a significant tax rate reduction) from
taxation by the target country for a defined period of time (thus "holiday").
It reduces, so goes the argument in its support, the high costs of new invest-
ment in a country and attract investors that may never have considered the
tax incentive granting country. The attraction of a tax holiday goes beyond
just exemption from taxation, since it also initially exempts foreign investors
from some of the compliance burden, understanding the tax system and in-
corporating local considerations into their global tax planning. Target coun-
tries eliminate this additional burden and reduce the risk that first-time in-
vestors face at the time when her actual and perceived risk is often the high-
est.
26
Technically, therefore, tax holidays should target only "new" investment
or investors. The expectation is for countries to lure these investors to come,
23 There are a few good surveys and comparisons of the various tax incentives' programs
available. See supra note 15.
24 See e.g. Easson, supra note 17 at 111.
25 See ibid. This is not different from the offshore regime model used by tax havens, yet for a
limited time and, maybe, scope.
26 Seeibid. at 111-12.
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invest, establish their business, and thereafter begin paying taxes and partici-
pate in the economy.27 In reality, however, tax holidays are often extended
again and again for long periods even when they are initially limited in
time. 28 Moreover, durations of tax incentives became standard, and similarly
are often extended almost automatically for identical, standard periods of
time. Long holidays, which are often granted to essentially all foreign inves-
tors regardless of whether they face market penetration costs or the extent of
such costs, put into question the rhetoric justifying their adoption.
Design difficulties also interfere with the optimization of tax holiday pe-
riods.29 Most foreign direct investment face losses in the initial investment
period, and if these losses cannot be carried forward and used in later fiscal
years they may increase the effective tax rate. Depreciation is also often avail-
able, which further delays the beginning day of positive tax liability. The
straight-forward solution to this problem is to start the holiday period when
profits are first generated. Yet, if a holiday begins when tax would have been
first paid, it may be the case that it would begin only four or five years into
the project. This means significant periods of non participation that may be
difficult to justify based on the traditional argument. Longer holidays also
have higher costs, and increased exposure to tax planning, complexity, etc. 3°
With respect to depreciation specifically, one may wish to postpone the
starting day of allowance for depreciation deductions, yet that may be too de-
tached from the economic depreciation reality, and effectively extend the
holiday period even more. Further, different investors and industries face
very different "start-up" periods, while tax holidays typically are set and stan-
dard, which reduces their efficacy. An attempt to be more selective and fine-
tune the details of holidays granted to different investors, if possible at all,
has its own shortcomings, such as distortions, further exposure to corrup-
tion, etc. Actual experience is that longer holidays are at least arguably suc-
27 See ibid.
28 See Holland & Vann, supra note 12 at 990.
2 See ibid. at990-91.
30 Seeibid.at991.
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cessful in achieving their goal of attracting long-term projects that may bene-
fit the target countries, a credit that shorter-term holidays can rarely claim.31
Reduction or elimination of taxes may be achieved not only through tax
holidays that are exclusive to foreign investors, but also through general re-
ductions of tax rates. Countries that do not generate much income from for-
eign investment, or even domestic taxpayers, may choose to save the costs of
monitoring incentives and enforcing their taxes, hoping to present a more
competitive faqade and reap the benefits from spillovers and the increased
collection of other taxes, tariffs or rents. Corporate income tax rates are often
the focus of analysis of general tax reductions as incentives for foreign direct
investment, yet countries also reduce other taxes to amplify their competitive
signal to investors or, alternatively, in response to investor demands.3 2 With-
holding taxes are important in this context since they are typically final taxes
imposed on gross receipts and often represent costs that cannot be quickly
recovered by foreign taxpayers, and, thus, are especially concerning to them
prior to their investment turning profitable.33 Other taxes that are sometimes
eliminated or applied using reduced rates are individual income taxes, Social
Security Contributions, custom duties, consumption taxes and various other
exit taxes. 34
A second kind of tax incentives reduce the tax base rather than the rates,
resulting in similarly reduced effective tax rates. These incentives are poten-
tially better targeted, yet less transparent. Accelerated depreciation allow-
ances are probably the most common of such measures.3" They permit the
write-off of certain preferred assets' costs quicker than their actual reduced
31 See ibid.
32 See e.g. John Norregaard & Tehmina S. Khan, "Tax Policy: Recent Trends and Coming
Challenges" (IMF Working Paper No. 07/0274, December 2007), online: IMF <http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07274.pdf>. For general global trends, see
KPMG, Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate Survey 2009, online: KPMG <http://www
.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndlnsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/KPMG-
Corporate-Indirect-Tax-Rate-Survey-2009.pdf>.
33 Withholding taxes are typically reduced by tax treaties, though.
34 See e.g. Easson, supra note 17 at 147-59.
35 For a concise description, see ibid. at 147-48.
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income production capacity.36 This and similar "acceleration" incentives fo-
cus on the timing of taxation, effectively differing taxation on current in-
come, consequently reducing current dollar (present value) amount of taxa-
tion. Another example is the allowance of certain or all deductions beyond
actual costs, or special incentives based on amounts spent on particular in-
vestments.37 Tax credits (or sometimes allowances or deductions) are granted
to investors based on the level of spending, above and beyond depreciation,
for instance. This incentive effectively transforms what would normally be
pre-tax dollars to after tax dollars if invested according to specific rules. In
terms of design, the first step is to clearly identify the investments that would
accord the incentive. In addition, often an amount limitation is used to con-
trol the desirable effect. The difficulty with this format is that it induces
maximization rather than optimization of the level of the relevant invest-
ment. This may result in revenue loss that exceeds potential benefits to the
target country, and even worse if the incentive results in a no-risk net dollar
gain to the investor (the tax benefit of the credit or depreciation exceed the
invested amount). These types of incentives are also problematic because
they do not benefit investors who lack taxable income in the target jurisdic-
tion. The investors may simply lose the benefit if, for instance, benefit cannot
be carried forward. Even then, the incentives they create may be significantly
reduced or lost due to the uncertainty of benefits and their postponed use-
fulness, a characteristic that also makes it especially prone to wasteful tax
planning.38
A third type of tax incentives is different from the above in form rather
than in substance. They include custom free trade or export processing zones
that are used by many developing countries to attract export oriented in-
36 Note that the simplest and maybe most common depreciation method-the straight line
method, that allows ratable recovery of cost base over the useful life of the relevant as-
set-is itself often more beneficial to taxpayers than real economic depreciation. Many
countries, including the U.S., go further than that and grant "accelerated depreciation,"
which allows taxpayers to write of more than the ratable portion of their cost base invest-
ment, detaching it even further from the economic reality, and results in an even lower ef-
fective tax rate.
37 See e.g. Holland & Vann, supra note 12 at 992-93.
38 See e.g. ibid. at 993.
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vestment to operate within their tax jurisdiction, yet be treated as if they were
out of it.39 So, the target country simply does not tax zone investments and if
the product of the investment is sold in that country it would be treated simi-
larly to other imports, as if it were produced outside the country's bounda-
ries. The benefits to target countries include: job creation, skill training,
technology spillovers and general regional development. They also often im-
plement this scheme to improve their foreign exchange position, since the in-
vestments result almost exclusively in exports.4° Investors who choose zones
are typically cost and tax conscious. They are also often very mobile and
therefore do not truly offer future tax receipts for the host country. The track
record of zones varies from mild success to horrible notoriety." When for-
eign exchange generated was meaningful enough for the host country zones
were more useful then when not.42 Still, they are not considered good devices
for development,43 even at the regional level, and all the challenges of the
other tax incentives such as tax holidays, tariff and VAT elimination, etc., ap-
ply to zones as well.
2. INSTITUTIONAL OPPOSITION TO TAx INCENTIVES
Only a few countries may claim their tax incentives programs are successful.
The only serious candidates in this regard are Singapore, Taiwan and Ireland,
which are transition economies rather than least developed ones. Yet, tax in-
centives may not be only, nor the optimal, route toward development, as has
been the case in Chile and Estonia, which have achieved comparable devel-
opment despite their avoidance of tax incentives;4 but this article saves the
39 See ibid. at 1006-08.
40 See ibid. at 1007.
41 See e.g. Dorsati Madani, "A Review of the Role and Impact of Export Processing Zones"
(World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2238, 1 November, 1999), online:
SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=629169>. See also World Bank, Export Processing
Zones (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1992).
42 See Holland & Vann, supra note 12 at 1007.
43 Ibid. at 1006-08.
44 Ibid. at 988.
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discussion of the desirability of tax incentives for a later section.45 This sec-
tion briefly reviews the opposition to this practice by the international eco-
nomic organizations that are typically powerful in the developing world to
complete the picture of current practice.
The fundamental argument for the almost universal opposition by inter-
national economic organizations is that tax incentives are inefficient; they
distort investment decisions by encouraging investment in countries or ac-
tivities other then those that would have been invested in absent the incen-
tives.46 Now, this, of course, is the explicit, even the sole, goal of the incen-
tives. Therefore, opponents complement the inefficiency argument with the
alternative argument that tax incentives are generally ineffective. Since tax is
not an important determinant of investment, tax incentives cannot affect the
relevant behaviour, or the investment decisions. Consequently, they are
wasteful.47 Further, they are particularly expensive to administer and moni-
tor, as a result they are often opaque and generally unfair.
Nonetheless, tax incentives carried the day, which softened the resistance,
replacing it with an approach such as the one in recent OECD reports, for
example, that focuses on the need to carefully use and design tax incentives.48
Interestingly, the most recent OECD publication on the relationship be-
tween tax and development does not refer directly to tax incentives, but fo-
cuses on better governance and international cooperation between develop-
ing and developed countries. 9 Finally, although not part of the development
efforts of the OECD, its (anti) harmful tax competition position also pre-
45 See below, Part II(B)(3).
'4 For a more detailed discussion and evaluation of these arguments, see ibid.
4' Note that the primary (inefficiency) argument is irreconcilable with the complementary
(ineffectiveness) argument against tax incentives. See ibid.
48 OECD, Corporate Tax Incentivesfor Foreign Direct Investment (Paris: OECD Publishing,
2001) [Corporate Tax]. For a similar, yet consistently cautious approach to tax incentives,
see OECD, Checklist for Foreign Direct Investment Incentive Policies (2003), online:
OECD <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/21/2506900.pdf> [Checklist].
49 OECD, Governance, Taxation and Accountability-Issues and Practices (2008), online:
OECD <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/35/40210055.pdf>.
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sents a general resistance to tax incentives in both developed and developing
countries. 0
The International Monetary Fund ("IMF") is probably the most active
among international institutions in the field of taxation in general and tax in-
centives in particular. Its policies, and particularly the infamous "condition-
alities" i.e., conditions that it dictates to its borrowers, are generally secretive,
yet it is clearly the strongest opponent to the use of tax incentives by develop-
ing countries.'I It clearly has not been successful in convincing even the poor-
est of countries that depend on its funds more than others to refrain from us-
ing tax incentives, 2 yet its influence has probably created some imbalances
between competitors who are bound by its arrangements and those who are
not. Independent research in this area is long due.53
The (less active in this area) World Bank also generally cautions countries
from using tax incentives. In its Tax Reform in Developing Countries publica-
tion, under Tax Reform Model for Developing Countries, it advises:
50 See the initiative's main website, online: OECD <http://www.oecd.org/department/
0,3355,en_2649_33745_1_1_1_1_1,00.html>.Thestatusandimportanceofthiseffort
are still uncertain at the time this article is written, yet one should note that its relevance
here is limited. It is interesting that even this universal and powerful initiative chose not
to address initially tax incentives to manufacturing, but rather specially-taxed regimes
(centres). See Easson, supra note 17 at 208.
5 In its most recent relevant policy paper, it is willing to say that in some circumstances tax
incentives may be used to correct for market failures, yet, it argues that this is a very lim-
ited and essentially academic argument and in practice: "The cost-effectiveness of provid-
ing tax incentives to promote investment is generally questionable." See Vito Tanzi &
Howell Zee, "Tax Policy for Developing Countries" (2001) 27 Economic Issues, online:
IMF <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues27/>. See also Sanjeev Gupta &
Shamsuddin Tareq, "Mobilizing Revenue" (2008) 45 Finance & Development 3, online:
IM F <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2008/09/gupta.htm> on tax incen-
tives in sub-Saharan Africa:
Such incentives not only shrink the tax base but also complicate tax administration and are a ma-
jor source of revenue loss and leakage from the taxed economy. Because investment decisions de-
pend on a host of factors that often carry more weight than tax incentives, these countries need to
improve the business climate while keeping the tax considerations as neutral as possible for inves-
tors.
52 See e.g. Gupta & Tareq, ibid.
53 Exceptional in this context is Miranda Stewart & Sunitajogarajan, "The International
Monetary Fund and Tax Reform" (2004) 2 Brit. Tax Rev. 146.
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Eschewing selective tax incentives and the tendency ofgovernment authori-
ties to pick winners and losers in the economy. Incentives automatically nar-
row tax bases, diminish revenue yields, most likely misallocate investment re-
sources most of the time, facilitate tax evasion, and seriously compromise the
goal of horizontal equity. Korea is the only country that made a serious ef-
fort to employ tax incentives in support of industrial policy but ... quickly
abandoned this policy because of these concerns.54
Later publications, though, present a somewhat more receptive approach, yet
not fundamentally different."
In conclusion, the various influential international institutions all oppose
the use of tax incentives. Nonetheless, in practice, their current work involves
the containment of the use of such incentives to limited cases, and to at-
tempts to steer the design of such incentives in a manner less vulnerable to
tax planning. Yet, the use of tax incentives by developing countries is not
solely based on a belief in their desirability, but also, and maybe mainly, due
to their belief that they do not have a choice in the face of tax competition,
which is explored next.
3. TAX COMPETITION
Tax competition has had a critical role in the evolvement of tax incentives
programs to date. Tax competition is not an easily definable concept, and it
takes place at several, distinct levels. Most obviously, countries compete over
foreign direct investment with other countries, and in that process wish to
present themselves as more attractive inter alia in terms of the tax burden
that investors face. Simple thinking suggests a snowball effect that would re-
sult in no taxation of foreign investment that is subject to tax competition,
and indeed this is what essentially happened."
54 Wayne Thirsk, ed., TaxReform in Developing Countries (Washington D.C.: World Bank,
1997) at 35.
55 See e.g. Joel Bergsman, "Advice on Taxation and Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct In-
vestment" (May 1999), online: Foreign Investment Advisory Service <http://www.fias
.net/documents/Seminari 9990527.doc>. See also Louis T. WellsJr. etal., "UsingTax In-
centives to Compete for Foreign Investment: Are They Worth the Costs?" (Foreign In-
vestment Advisory Service, Occasional Paper No. 15, Washington D.C., 2001).
56 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 12 at 1573.
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A more complete tale should include the investors, primarily the multina-
tional enterprises that wish to establish, say, a single factory in the south-east
Asian region. Investors are aware of the advantages of certain countries in
that region, and these neighbouring countries do not differ much in terms of
the relevant parameters (availability of skilled and unskilled workers, cost of
labour, political and economic stability, etc.). At that point research teaches
us that investors are probably the most sensitive to tax rates.57 They are pri-
marily interested in cutting their costs, and, if so, it is understandable that
they will request tax incentives packages, which intensify the tax competition
in certain settings (south-east Asia in our illustration).5 Such intensification
does not require active lobbying (bullying?) on the side of multinational cor-
porations since it may be enough that governments believe that tax is a cru-
cial factor in investors' decisions, and will all eventually offer essentially the
same incentives. This is exactly what happened in reality.
Tax competition therefore both changes the power balance between
countries and multinational enterprises in an opening world economy and
prevents countries in the above circumstances from tailoring tax incentives to
their needs and wishes. Tax holidays become the baseline rather than special
preferences with power to incentivize investment. The lack of tax holidays is
now effectively viewed as a disincentive to invest. Countries who need or be-
lieve that they need foreign investment lose control over their fiscal powers
vis- -vis such foreign investors. They are not forced to do that, yet the alter-
native, as they see it, is receiving no or undesirable investment.
Another level of competition occurs within countries, between regions or
states. In the context of the developing world, the decision to promote one
57 See e.g. Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, "The Three Parties in the Race to the Bot-
tom: Host Governments, Home Governments and Multinational Companies" (CESifo
Working Paper Series No. 1613, December 2005), online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=875308>; Rosanne Altshuler, Harry Grubert & T. Scott Newlon, "Has U.S. In-
vestment Abroad Become More Sensitive to Tax Rates?" (NBER Working Paper No.
W6383, January 1998), online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=226131 >.
58 See e.g. Reed E. Hundt, In China's Shadow: The Crisis of American Entrepreneurship
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) at 21-22. See also letter from Emeritus Profes-
sor Lawrie Lyons to the Productivity Commission, Australia ( 11 July 1996), online: Pro-
ductivity Commission <http://www.pc.gov.au/_data/assets/pdffile/0017/37340/
sub008.pdf>.
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region over another still has a lot to do with the central or federal govern-
ments, so it is not materially different, just presents a different set of choices
to investors.
A somewhat different level of competition occurs between regions of the
world. Countries, both developed and developing, explore opportunities to
organize and improve the mutual goals. Alas, in most cases these are unsuc-
cessful, at least in the context of tax incentives in the developing world." The
European Union presents a different model, yet it is a model that may not be
implementable in the developing world.6°
Finally, there is internal competition between various sectors or indus-
tries. This is important since we have seen the importance of technology and
technology spillovers to the success of incentives, as a possible true determi-
nant of growth.
In conclusion, this section surveyed the use of tax incentives by develop-
ing countries, which is essentially universal and widespread. It is so despite
the strong opposition to it by the very influential international institutions
that are often able to dictate policy paths to developing countries, and de-
spite the very weak or nonexistent evidence in support of their efficacy. It
concluded with a short discussion of tax competition, which is part an expla-
nation, part an important circumstance that plays a major role in the preva-
lence of tax incentives in developing countries. The next section analyzes the
straightforward or stated rationale in support of tax incentives: that they at-
tract foreign direct investment, which is instrumental for development.
59 But see positive developments in the east African community, e.g. IMF, "Kenya, Uganda,
and United Republic of Tanzania: Selected Issues" (Country Report No. 08/353, Octo-
ber 2008), online: IMF <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/crO8353.pdf>.
60 Even there, however, there is a serious struggle over what and how to do, and the tax in-
centives related regime, called "state aid" has gained strength only recently. For additional
information, see the relevant European Commission website, online: <http://ec.europa
.eu/competition/state aid/reform/reform.html>.
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B. WHY Do THEY Do WHAT THEY Do?
I. THE QUEST FOR DEVELOPMENT VIA GROWTH, AND
GROWTH DETERMINANTS
The prevalence of tax incentives, especially in light of the strong opposition
to their use, begs the question in the title: Why do they do what they do?
There are at least three levels of analysis: theoretical, practical and political.
One must ask whether in theory tax incentives can promote development,
and in what manner. An optimistic answer is not sufficient, however, as de-
sign and implementation issues come into play if one were to pragmatically
use the theoretical insights. Empirical evidence is particularly useful at this
level of analysis. This is not the end; since political concerns are crucially im-
portant in this context, even the theoretically perfect and most beautifully
designed mechanism may easily fail if it does not seriously take politics into
account. This section cannot, of course, comprehensively cover all of this
analysis, yet it wishes to highlight what must be discovered and make some
key observations about what we already know about some of these issues. It
begins with the theoretical exposure, following the standard justification of
tax incentives, i.e. they encourage foreign direct investment that promotes
growth that promotes development.6
A first step in this analysis would be to understand better the relationship
between development and growth. It is not so much that the relationship be-
tween growth and development is in question rather it is important to know
what are the determinants of growth that may support it in its role in devel-
opment. A serious focus on the economic research of growth naturally took
place in the second half of the 20th century as the postcolonial post-World
War II world emerged from the ashes of those traumatic times. This is still
61 In a way, this section is an expansion of the work of Professor Yoram Margalioth, who ar-
gued for the use of tax incentives as a technological progress and therefore growth pro-
moting mechanism. See Yoram Margalioth, "Tax Competition, Foreign Direct Invest-
ment and Growth: Using the Tax System to Promote Developing Countries" (2003) 23
Va. Tax Rev. 161. This article evaluates each link in the logical chain-tax incentives -)
FDI -- growth -- development-separately, and further explores the circumstances
where tax incentives could promote development, such as international cooperation,
which is an important condition to progress also according to Margalioth.
2010
U.B.C. LAW REVIEW
very much an evolving area of research, both theoretical and empirical, as
much success, and yet even more smouldering failure, resulted from devel-
opment policies that followed the guidance of such research.62
The basic, obviously intriguing, question is: Why are some countries
poor and others rich?63 Growth rates since World War II were unprecedent-
edly high, yet growth rates differ significantly between countries, resulting in
a quite consistent widening of the gap between rich and poor countries.64
Moreover, rich countries have proven to be more resilient to economic
downturns; they did not suffer long and significant economic decline follow-
ing crises, whereas poor countries did, further increasing the widening gap.6"
Concern about this phenomenon triggered much of the interest in growth
and development economics.
Economists commonly use real income (or GDP) per capita to measure
national living standards. 66 Changes in real income per capita are then used
to measure economic growth rates. The task of the relevant research was
therefore to explain the increased inequality between poor and rich countries
in times of overall significant average growth of real income per capita in our
world. Early research emphasized the role of accumulation of capital, both
physical and human, since scientists believed that it responded to economic
incentives and therefore could be affected by economic policy.67 The primary
62 Of course, research does not guarantee success.
63 A question asked continuously by economists since Adam Smith's 1776 Inquiry into the
Nature and Causes of "the Wealth of Nations."
64 See e.g. Helpman, supra note 22 at 2. See generally Nathan Rosenberg & Luther Earle
BirdzellJr.,How the West Grew Rich: TheEconomic Transformation ofthe Industrial Word
(New York: Basic Books, 1986).
65 For example, the oil crisis of 1973. See Helpman, supra note 22 at 1-8.
66 Ibid. at 1. The UN attempted, with its Human Development Index, to develop a less
rough measurement mechanism, including health and education in addition to income.
See UNDP, Human Development Index, online: UNDP <http://hdr.undp.org/en/
reports/publications/title,4182,en.html>.
67 They ignored the role of technological changes, assuming that it generally does not.
VOL. 42:2
A FRAMEWORK FORAN INFORMED STUDY
contribution of this research is attributed to Robert Solow,68 who observed
that in the long run a country's growth depends on (and converges with)
technological change. Since technological change was assumed not to re-
spond to economic incentives, and therefore not to be affected by economic
policy and incentives,6 9 Solow predicted that economic policy and incentives
cannot affect long-term growth. A more particular observation was that
growth is limited by a country's capital-to-labour ratio (there are just so many
machines that one person can work).7 ° Empirical research generally sup-
ported these observations with respect to rich countries, yet it could not ex-
plain the divergence between poor and rich countries, a gap that was sup-
posed to vanish in the long term."
Later research explored an alternative explanation that productivity of
inputs is an important factor for growth, presumably a more important fac-
tor than its accumulation. 72 Empirical research further found that quality or
productivity of the inputs-labour, capital, or land-does not by itself ex-
plain the overall productivity levels. This meant that some or even a signifi-
cant portion of productivity should be attributed to total factor productivity,
which measures the joint effectiveness of all inputs combined in producing
output.73 Investment in research and development explains much of the dif-
fering total factor productivity levels between countries. 74 Technological
change became therefore an important focus of this research. Rising techno-
logical change could also reconcile the Solow model with the fact that uni-
68 See especially Robert M. Solow, "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth"
(1965) 70 QuarterlyJournal of Economics 65; Robert M. Solow, "Technical Change and
the Aggregate Production Function" (1957) 39 Review of Economics and Statistics 312.
69 "Exogenous" in the economists' language.
70 Which is a simple declining marginal productivity of capital observation.
71 Some economists attempted to explain these differences with the relationship between
physical and human capital. See N. Gregory Mankiw, "The Growth of Nations" (1995)
26 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 275. Yet, it is highly debatable that this expla-
nation is sufficient. See Helpman, supra note 22 at 17-18.
72 See Helpman, ibid. at 19-33.
73 See ibid. at 33.
74 See ibid. at 34-85.
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versal growth rate accelerates, since he held technological change constant
and predicted decline in growth rates.
A critical contribution here was Professor Paul Romer's model that based
output not only on private factors of production but also on an economy
wide stock of knowledge that increases over time.75 His key contribution was
the disposal of the assumption that technological change, that most impor-
tant driver of growth, cannot be affected by economic incentives. Investment
in knowledge may therefore wield economy wide positive externalities, and
the governments are able to do something about the growth of their coun-
tries' economies. Further research expanded and developed this approach,
and proved that the effect of technology and innovation is very important,
yet due to the multiplicity of the "moving parts:' the design of growth poli-
cies remained complicated.
A further complication in the process of understanding economic
Growth is that growth in no country is truly independent of that of other
countries. Cross-border flow of technology, knowledge, and trade and in-
vestment affect participating countries. The interdependence of countries'
income levels is sometimes directly, and in other cases indirectly, effected
through their effect on productivity. The key for this is country specializa-
tion that is possible only due to participation in international trade. A critical
aspect in this context is the effect of research and development. It is well
known that almost all research and development ("R&D") is performed in a
few rich countries.76 The question is whether it benefits the rest of the world
or simply fortifies rich countries in their advantaged position, further distin-
guishing them from the rest of the world. Recent research indicates that (for-
eign/rich countries) R&D significantly benefits developing countries that
trade with the rich countries through its effect on the developing countries
total factor productivity. The other side of it, however, is that rich countries
75 See Paul M. Romer, "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth" (1986) 94 Journal of
Political Economy 1002; Paul M. Romer, "Endogenous Technological Change" (1990) 98
Journal of Political Economy 71.
76 See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005: Transnational Corporations and the Inter-
nationalization ofR&D (2005), online: UNCTAD <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
wir2005ch3_en.pdf> at c. 3.
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benefit from R&D more than developing countries and hence investment in
R&D overall widens the gap between the rich and poor countries.
The effect of institutions (such as the substantive legal system, the rule of
law, and politics) is another critical factor in materialization of economic
growth.77 They are practically managing the relevant policies, such as innova-
tion and knowledge accumulation. Limited progress has been achieved in
this context, yet some things seem obvious, such as the intuition that corrup-
tion, lack of rule of law, and political instability limit the options for growth.
Geography has also been blamed,78 yet there is little support for this conten-
tion as an alternative to the importance of institutions.
Another relevant aspect has proven to be inequalities within and among
developing countries themselves. Inequality slows growth, yet research has
not been able to convincingly demonstrate how exactly this result occurs, nor
has research identified what can we learn about it in the context of develop-
ment. For example, it cannot be said that democratic decision to redistribute
wealth within a country is necessarily detrimental to growth.79 A more ex-
treme aspect of inequality is the contention that growth is bad for the poor,
based on the decreasing share of the poor in world wealth and the increasing
gap. Research, however, demonstrates that average income of the poor has
risen around the world.8 °
In conclusion, the mystery of economic growth" is sure to continue and
engage further economic research.82 The role of institutions in particular will
surely be the focus of much effort, yet there is much that we do know already,
including that the effect of institutions on growth is important. We under-
stand the important role of innovation as a driver of technological change, its
effect on productivity, and the importance of productivity for growth. We
also can appreciate the relationship between productivity and accumulation
77 See Helpman, supra note 22 at 111-44.
78 See Sachs, supra note 3 at 57-59.
79 See Helpman, supra note 22 at 93-94.
80 See ibid. at 109.
81 The title of ibid.
82 As well as the balance between economic growth and other determinants of development,
an issue that is beyond the scope of this article. See however Sen, supra note 8.
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of capital, both physical and human. We also know that we need to take into
account the interdependence of countries, especially when the least devel-
oped countries are concerned. One challenge of future research is how to in-
corporate tax measures in support of these engines of growth.83
Next, the article explores the next, less obvious link in the logical chain
justifying the use of tax incentives: Whether foreign direct investment con-
tributes to growth and, and if it does, then how? Note that this section has
not mentioned investment as a determinant of growth, since it relates to a
different order question, which is explored later: Whether and in what man-
ner does foreign direct investment affect the important growth determinants
discussed in this section?
2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FDL AND GROWTH
If development is to be achieved via economic growth, tax incentives may
contribute to the achievement only if foreign direct investment that is alleg-
edly attracted by these incentives contributes to economic growth.84 Despite
the importance of this question and its extensive study, answers are hard to
come by, bringing to question the rationale for using tax incentives.
The centrality of foreign direct investment stems from the assertion in
the "Washington Consensus" that it promotes development and the more of
it the better.8 5 This assertion was carried forward and argued conventionally
83 So, for example, tax incentives that promote innovation may be preferred to those that do
not or to those that provide costly incentives to things other than innovation, some of
which may not promote growth. Capital accumulation is just one example. Obviously
such research is very sensitive to country and industry specific circumstances.
84 Let us assume for now that the single goal and relevant effect of tax incentives in this con-
text is to attract FDI. This is the rhetoric behind tax incentives. This is important also be-
cause of the magnitude of FDI and the fact that it has been growing exponentially. See
Maria Carkovic & Ross Levine, "Does Foreign Direct Investment Accelerate Economic
Growth?" in Theodore H. Moran, Edward M. Graham & Magnus Blomstr6m, eds., Does
Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development? (Washington D.C.: Institute for Interna-
tional Economics, 2005) 195.
85 The term "Washington Consensus" was coined byJohn Williamson in a 1989 summary
often key development advice items commonly shared by the Washington D.C. institu-
tions-the IMF and the World Bank, and by the U.S. Treasury Department. The original
context was advice to Latin American countries following the 1980s crisis. SeeJohn Wil-
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by business groups and multinational enterprises as a standard argument for
investment promoting incentives. Academic research, on the other hand, ex-
pressed skepticism about the uniqueness and utility of foreign direct invest-
ment for development.8 6 Developing countries generally bought the story of
foreign direct investment's importance, yet the strongest of them emphasized
selectiveness, seeking "quality" investment that would ensure the desirable
positive effects (externalities), through technology transfers, domestic pro-
duction, domestic ownership, etc. This latter strategy signals that at least
some countries do not believe that foreign direct investment is universally
positive and worthwhile providing incentives for. If one conclusion may be
drawn from the divergent relevant economic research, it is that the impact of
foreign direct investment on growth is not one dimensional: it has some
positive as well as potentially negative consequences, leading a recent study
to conclude that "the search for universal relationships is futile."8 7
Often, foreign direct investment effectiveness is strongly associated with
certain circumstances of the target economy. An economy that is fairly open
to trade and investment may benefit immensely from foreign direct invest-
ment that would channel to it and expose it and its people (workers, skilled
and unskilled, managers and business relations) to (developed) world-class
R&D, management techniques, quality control, etc.88 Foreign direct invest-
liamson, "What Washington Means by Policy Reform" in John Williamson, ed., Latin
American Readjustment: HowMuch has Happened? (Washington D.C.: Institute for In-
ternational Economics, 1990) 5. This advice later became the symbol of what is often
called market fundamentalism. For reflection on the evolution of the term and its symbol-
ism. See Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski &John Williamson, eds.,Afterthe Washington Consensus
(Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2003).
86 See e.g. Dani Rodrik, The New Global Economy and Developing Countries (Washington
D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1999) at 37.
87 Robert E. Lipsey & Fredrik Sj6holm, "The Impact of Inward FDI on Host Countries:
Why Such Different Answers ?" in Moran, Graham & Blomstr6m,supra note 84,23 at 40.
88 Multinational Enterprises (hierarchically organized) who trade internally, i.e. between
parents and subsidiaries, may be instrumental to growth ifallowed to perform such inter-
nal trading and freely invest. They are more likely to move more production, more tech-
nology, etc., to the target (developing) countries and generate more positive spillovers for
such economy. It is the synergy between liberal trade and investment policies that result in
economic growth. See Theodore H. Moran, Edward M. Graham & Magnus Blomstr6m,
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ment can make domestic firms perform better as it pushes the domestic
economy to be more efficient, expand and even diversify. This may happen
through competition with domestic firms, training them to partner or com-
plement the foreign firms or implicitly by example or creation of new oppor-
tunities through introduction to foreign or global networks or agglomera-
tion.89 In these cases, it is believed that foreign direct investment can contrib-
ute beyond the mere capital it contributes to such economy.90 When foreign
direct investment is accompanied with increases in trade, it has the potential
to contribute to growth.9' Moreover, research has established that it is posi-
tively associated with growth particularly when the target economy has ac-
cumulated a minimal stock of human capital.92 Conversely, when the target
economy is protective, with significant restrictions on trade and investment,
foreign direct investment may simply compete with domestic firms over do-
mestic resources, often leading to inefficiencies and "export" rather than in-
crease of domestic welfare." Such investment results in either utilization of
inferior technology and involvement of foreign firms with the narrow goal of
domestic rent extraction, or involvement of inferior foreign investors that
"Introduction and Overview" in Moran, Graham & Blomstr6m, supra note 84, 1 at 14-
15.
89 "Agglomeration economies are the benefits that come when firms and people locate near
one another together in cities and industrial clusters." Edward L. Glaeser, "Introduction"
in Edward L. Glaeser, ed., Agglomeration Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2010) 1 at 1.
90 But see Dani Rodrik, "Appel Inaugural Lecture" (Columbia University, 27 March 2003)
("One dollar of FDI is worth no more (and no less) than a dollar of any other kind of in-
vestment").
91 See Theodore H. Moran, Edward M. Graham & Magnus Blomsr6m, "Conclusions and
Implications for FDI Policy in Developing Countries, New Methods of Research, and a
Future Research Agenda" in Moran, Graham & Blomstr6m, supra note 84, 375 at 376.
92 See Moran, Graham & Blomstr6m, supra note 88 at 10.
93 In these circumstances foreign direct investment is usually targeting the domestic markets
rather than export oriented, and would often be required to be conducted through joint
ventures with domestic ownership or even relinquish control to domestic ownership.
Also, it is often required to use domestic material and share its technology with domestic
elements, the consequence of which is a lack of incentive to use cutting edge technology
and maximize involvement.
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cannot positively contribute to the target economy. Not surprisingly, when
accompanied with restrictions on trade and investment, foreign direct in-
vestment may hurt economic growth.94 These policies may prevent foreign
direct investment from contributing to growth.95 This observation, however,
is not nuanced enough to be useful in guiding policy.96 A related distinction
is between export-oriented foreign direct investment that is typically associ-
ated with more liberal trade and investment policies and with foreign major-
ity owned businesses, and accordingly with positive spillovers, and a (domes-
tic) market seeking investment that is typically associated with domestic ma-
jority ownership and restrictive trade and investment policies, and accord-
ingly is not associated with positive spillovers.9 7
Finally, even if positive spillovers were to be detected, it is still not clear
that foreign direct investment that generated them is desirable because its at-
traction involves costs. The challenge is to measure the existence and magni-
tude of these externalities. This is difficult to prove and calculate, and ac-
cordingly determining desirability of foreign direct investment attraction is
very challenging. Consequently, this link in the logical (causality) chain is, at
best, weak. Next, the article explores the final link in the chain (the relation-
ship between tax incentives and foreign direct investment), independently of
the doubt about the validity of the relationship between foreign direct in-
vestment and growth.
94 See Moran, Graham & Blomstr6m, supra note 91 at 376.
95 See Marc J. Melitz, "Comment" in Moran, Graham & Blomstr6m, supra note 84, 273.
96 Note, ofcourse that policydiscussion must take into account other possible ways to facili-
tate FDI in various ways, not only subsidies and tax incentives, but also with a supply of
skilled workers, skill training, accommodating regulation, infrastructure, information
providing, all of which reduces domestic costs.
97 See Theodore H. Moran, "How Does FDI Affect Host Country Development? Using
Industry Case Studies to Make Reliable Generalizations" in Moran, Graham & Blom-
str6m, supra note 84,281; China is a good example for the former-see Guoqiang Long,
"China's Policies on FDI: Review and Evaluation" in Moran, Graham & Blomstr6m, su-
pra note 84, 315-and Africa generally for the latter-see Todd J. Moss, Vijaya
Ramachandran & Manju Kedia Shah, "Is Africa's Skepticism of Foreign Capital Justified?
Evidence from East African Firm Survey Data", in Moran, Graham & Blomstr6m, supra
note 84, 337. Most non-extractive industry in Africa was import substituting.
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3. TAx INCENTIVES AND THE ATTRACTION OF FDI
For tax incentives to attract foreign direct investment, firms must take taxes,
and most importantly effective tax rates, into serious consideration in their
decisions whether and when to invest. Taxation is, of course, just one consid-
eration that these multinational enterprises weigh in the decision. There is
extensive economic literature that explores their considerations. Key are: in-
frastructure, cost of labor, skilled labor available, availability of natural re-
sources, political climate and stability, economic stability, bureaucracy level,
lack of corruption, local or regional market size, costs and availability of
transportation and communication, currency regulation, legal environment,
and sometimes even taxation. 98
Foreign direct investment has grown steadily in the last three decades
consistent with globalization. Most of this growth, however, took place in
developed countries. Investment in developing countries has grown as well.
Typical foreign direct investment in a developing country take the form of
what is commonly called "Greenfield investment," i.e., opening a business and
penetrating the market rather than acquiring an already up-and-running do-
mestic business, which may explain some of the difference. Tax incentives, as
already mentioned, are designed specifically to attract such Greenfield in-
vestment by first time foreign investors in a country.
In order to understand better the role of taxation in investment decisions,
it is useful to elaborate a little on foreign direct investment generally. The
main benefit attributed to foreign direct investment is efficiency. The basic
story is that if investment flew freely it would end up where it would maxi-
mize its owner's wealth and consequently global wealth (increase the global
pie). Any restrictions or barriers would result in less than maximum global
wealth gain. Global efficiency is not, however, a consensus goal, and in fact it
typically carries little weight with the most important players in this game.
The capital exporting country, which is the residence of the investor, some-
times called the "home country," naturally wishes to maximize its own
wealth. Maximization of global wealth may not mean maximization of every
country's wealth at the same time, and therefore such country may choose
not to leave foreign direct investment free of its regulation. The target, or
98 See e.g. Easson, supra note 17 at 19-34.
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"host" country faces similar incentives. Note that it is enough that one of the
countries involved interfere and regulate the investment to potentially force
all of them to do so even if some may be content with completely free flow of
investment in the first place. Finally, the investors, i.e., multinational enter-
prises, may maximize their profits by taking a course that is not necessarily
globally wealth maximizing. This is probably inevitable once the relevant
countries regulate it in one way or the other. Since we do not have a world
government and even not strong cooperation among the countries of the
world, seeking the goal of global efficiency is probably unattainable under
these circumstances. An important factor that makes this picture even more
complex is that the players often have very different powers vis-a-vis each
other.99
One could assume that a multinational enterprise would not make an in-
vestment that does not benefit it, '00 and one such benefit could be low effec-
tive taxation. The vast literature attempting to isolate the effect of taxation
on foreign direct investment, however, resulted in mixed results. The differ-
ences in results are large at times, so reaching general conclusions may be dif-
ficult. Nonetheless, one may say at least that taxation plays a relatively small
role in the original decision to engage in foreign direct investment, yet it of-
ten plays a role, albeit not always important, in the decision where to locate
it,101 at least at the margin. 10 2 Take for example, a multinational enterprise in
the business of manufacturing sports goods that wishes to increase produc-
tion to respond to demand. It concludes that it needs another plant. It is un-
derstandable that labour cost is key to the decision to do that outside the
United States. Labour costs, skills and general stability lead it to choose
South East Asia. Now, let's say (hypothetically) that Thailand, Malaysia and
Vietnam may all be appropriate in terms of infrastructure, transportation
costs, etc. This is the stage where one can see tax entering the equation. If one
99 See above, Part II(A)(3).
100 Yet the countries involved may very well face not only insufficient increase in wealth but
also wealth decreases or other harms from FDI, as has been explored in the former sec-
tion.
101 Studies found that often political and market climate were more important.
102 See UNCTAD, FDI, supra note 17 at c. 4
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of these countries can secure a better financial, including tax, package for the
investor, it may be in an advantageous position. Note in recent years, as glob-
alization thrives, it becomes more likely that other conditions equalize, po-
tentially leaving a more important role for taxation in such decisions. "3 Still,
that is true probably with respect to the final location decision (in contrast to
the choice of region, etc.).
The effects of taxation on foreign direct investment may be significantly
different also for different types of investments. Studies found that export-
oriented investment is more sensitive to taxation than, for instance, invest-
ment that attempts to penetrate certain markets (import substituting in-
vestment). 1' Note that we have seen this distinction in the context of the ef-
ficacy of foreign direct investment, and said that research supports the sug-
gestion that export-oriented foreign direct investment is more likely to con-
tribute to growth then import-substituting foreign direct investment. This is
encouraging for the case in support of tax incentives, since at least they have
the potential to attract certain desirable types of investment. A less re-
searched issue is the difference between industries. Existing research suggests
that there are significant differences between industries in their sensitivity to
tax. Most obviously, the more portable industries will be more sensitive to
taxation than the less portable ones.'05 In general, legal tax research and tax
laws essentially ignore differences between industries per se. In our case in
particular, this kind of research seems particularly desirable.
Finally, one must be careful to attribute importance to taxation in gen-
eral. The role of tax administration and other bureaucratic functions of tax
103 Indeed, more recent U.S. studies may support this contention. See e.g. Harry Grubert &
John Mutti, "Do Taxes Influence Where U.S. Corporations Invest?" (2000) 53 Nat'l Tax
J. 825.
104 For example, the choice to locate a computer chip manufacturing facility in China, Viet-
nam or the Philippines may be more sensitive to domestic taxation than the choice be-
tween the same countries for the purposes of locating a television assembly facility for dis-
tribution in the respective domestic markets.
105 See G. Peter Wilson, "The Role of Taxes in Location and Sourcing Decisions" in Alberto
Giovannini, R. Glenn Hubbard & Joel Slemrod, eds., Studies in International Tavation
(Chicago: University of. Chicago Press, 1993) at 195. See also, in a particular European
context, Michael P. Devereux, "The Impact of Taxation on International Business: Evi-
dence from the Ruding Committee Survey" (1992) 2 EC Tax Review 105.
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authorities are beyond the scope of this article. The corporate income tax is
normally the focus of studies, yet custom duties and import taxes are impor-
tant as well. There is some role also to individual tax, social contributions
and consumption taxes, but no evidence that it is material.
Now we ask whether tax incentives themselves are capable of increasing
desirable foreign direct investment (not only that foreign direct investment is
sensitive to taxation generally)? Most academics and tax experts answer this
in the negative, claiming that tax incentives are overall undesirable. The pri-
mary case against them is based on efficiency considerations: tax incentives
distort behaviour and thus must result in efficiency losses in the relevant
markets. This argument's biggest difficulty is that this is the essence of what
tax incentives are trying to do: create an incentive for people to invest in a
place where they would not otherwise invest. Global efficiency losses are not
a primary concern of developing countries implementing tax incentives; their
own markets' condition is. A more concerning argument is that tax incen-
tives are not effective since tax is not an important determinant of foreign di-
rect investment as we explored in the last section. Further, the critics argue
that their costs often exceed their benefits; they are costly and difficult to
administer and police. They are particularly exposed to corruption in coun-
tries where corruption is a major economic concern, and they are almost by
definition inequitable, promoting certain investments and investors over
others.
Against this consensus a few have argued that tax incentives might be de-
sirable from a developing country's perspective. The most serious argument is
that they promote investment that brings technology to these countries and
positive spillover effects that assists them in their quest for growth. 0 6 How-
ever, the theoretical opposition to tax incentives is somewhat academic (since
everybody uses them), and hence the tax incentives discourse shifted focus
from the desirability of tax incentives in general to their acceptance almost as
a necessary evil and concentration on ways of making them more effective
and efficient. Next, we examine the basic arguments against the use of tax in-
centives by developing countries, and some of the responses to these argu-
ments.
106 See Margalioth, supra note 61.
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The efficiency argument against tax incentives is based on the behav-
ioural distortion created by tax incentives. Investors are encouraged to do
something that they would not otherwise do: invest in country A rather than
country B, in zone A rather than zone B, (in the extreme case) in industry A
rather than industry B, or hire more workers than one optimally would. The
achievement of the distortion is the goal of the tax incentive. If it is not
achieved, for instance because the investor intended to invest in country A or
in zone A anyway, then the incentive is a pure waste (since it does not have
the intended effect). In that case it is also distortionary and inefficient be-
cause it provides an unintended advantage to the incentive recipient (over
her competitors). This latter distortion may happen even if the tax incentive
is effective if competitors of the tax incentive recipient or its indirect com-
petitors (producer of substitutable goods, for example) do not get an exactly
equivalent tax incentive-a very likely scenario. 0 7 The competition distor-
tion is exacerbated by the fact that developing countries' governments may be
weak vis- -vis the multinational enterprises seeking tax incentives, which may
result in tax incentives that benefit only some of them and possibly in inef-
fective tax incentives of the various kinds described above. 108 This story lies at
the heart of the tax competition problem discussed above.'09
This distortion, however, is not necessarily efficiency reducing; it may be
desirable if, for instance, it "corrects" a market failure. 11 One such situation is
when there is no functioning market to speak of, such as in the ex-communist
countries. Another is sub-optimal R&D, yet this may not be very convincing
in many developing countries.
Even if a market failure was evident, correcting it requires that it could be
corrected by tax incentives and, very importantly, that governments would be
able to use tax incentives for these purposes measurably and correctly. Gov-
ernments are notoriously convinced that they could do that, and more im-
portantly, they seldom take into account the side effects of such policies, such
107 We can expand the analysis to global distortions that are probable, but this is beyond the
scope of this article.
108 In addition, of course these are more prone to corruption, etc.
109 See above, Part II(A)(3).
"0 See Easson, supra note 17 at 64.
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as decreased development of other industries or regions, diversion of skilled
workers from a non-incentivized industry to one that receives incentives.
If tax incentives, however, do not change behaviour then they are even
more obviously wasteful. General evidence may not be helpful since it aver-
ages many different situations and types of rules, however, it gives a general
indication about the efficacy of this policy device, i.e. that only a small mi-
nority of tax incentives may actually work."' Familiarity with the specifics of
the available data is important to understand it. Most of the data comes from
survey studies, and little to no evidence comes from the employing countries
themselves. This last point is very important since it signals there is a lack of
"accountability," that the utilization of the incentives is not transparent and
there is no control post enactment-this creates a dilemma since stability is
important for effectiveness as well-we shall elaborate on this separately.
Another key point in understanding the effectiveness of tax incentives is
the existence of tax competition that potentially wipes out the incentive part,
leaving a disincentive to invest absent a "tax incentive.'
Tax incentives are available to both market and export oriented invest-
ment. The former get it due to the fear that maybe they will leave after all,
even though the evidence is quite clear that there is no incentive in them.
The latter receive them as part of the package that target countries present to
an investor that is interested in low costs of production, etc. Some countries
with particular advantages may go even further, attempting to attract head-
quarters (and other, tax haven or offshore-style enterprises). The latter for-
mat does not normally fit productive developing countries since they need
spillover effects to justify the loss of revenue. The offshore model is for coun-
tries that do not have any chance of attracting direct investment that may re-
sult in spillovers so they give up revenues that they never had a chance of get-
ting anyway for some fees and a few particular non-productive jobs, etc. This
activity will never feed millions of poor people so it is beyond the scope of
this article.
"I See ibid. at 66-67.
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4. A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE DESIRABILITY OF
TAx INCENTIVES
Even an effective tax incentive is not desirable if it does not generate enough
of a benefit to cover its costs. The costs of tax incentives include both for-
gone revenue and indirect costs, such as the distortions that they create in the
target market. The revenue loss may seem the more obvious cost; yet, in a
second glance one should understand that it has no cost at all if indeed effec-
tive. If a tax incentive attracts investment that would not otherwise land in
the target country or more specifically would not result in taxable income in
the target country, then no revenue is forgone. Unfortunately, it is very diffi-
cult to determine which investment is of the sort that would not otherwise
be made in the target country. If the investment is of the sort that was in-
creased in response to the investment or allocated differently accordingly it
becomes much more difficult to delineate the part of the investment that is
incremental, and consequently very difficult to assess the true revenue cost of
the relevant tax incentive.112
One direct response to this difficulty may be that better administration
and enforcement can improve the purity of investments that benefit from tax
incentives, yet there is a catch: the less general an incentives regime is the
more it is exposed to the indirect costs or distortions created by them (substi-
tution, corruption, discrimination, etc.). Part of the substitution story is that
tax incentives will particularly attract short-term high profit investment" 3
that may not be of the type that has many beneficial spillovers.
Finally, there are some costs that are more technical. Tax incentives com-
plicate the target countries' tax systems, and often facilitate tax avoidance as
well." 4 This increases the costs of compliance, administration and enforce-
ment, and potentially affects the perception of the tax system's clarity and le-
gitimacy, which may lead to reduced efficacy.
The benefit side of the analysis is not easier to figure out. Direct revenue
benefits include revenue from taxation beyond the type that enjoys the in-
112 See ibid. at 75, citing E. Bloch, "The Case for Tax Incentives" (1995) 6:3 International
Tax Review 28.
113 See Holland & Vann, supra note 12 at 989.
114 See ibid.
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centive or, for instance, revenue collected in the future, when the tax holidays
expire. Both benefits, but particularly the latter, seem theoretical, since an in-
vestor is strong, etc. The more important benefits are the spillover effects,
skill training and technology transfers, etc. It is easy to see how difficult it is
to calculate such benefits, especially in periods that are less than long-term.
A cost-benefit analysis is therefore immensely difficult to honestly con-
duct, and most available studies took place in limited industries and in de-
veloped countries where the availability and sophistication of data are obvi-
ously materially different from that in the developing world. A better, and
preferably simpler (usable), mechanism for such analysis is clearly required.
III. THE ROLE OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
A. WHAT Do DEVELOPED COUNTRIES CURRENTLY Do?
It is not difficult to understand that developed countries have an important
role in the process of developing countries' development. They regulate and
often tax the investors in developing countries. These investors overwhelm-
ingly reside or headquarter in developed countries. They also set the tone on
the world stage and inside international organizations where international
trade and investment regimes are modulated. Finally, much in line with the
working assumption of this article, developed countries are heavily involved
in activities in support of development, and they devote significant resources
to this goal." 5 This section analyzes the actions of developed countries in
support of development in the context of taxation, the desirability of such
actions, and proposed reforms.
I. TAX SPARING AND MATCHING CREDITS
The most direct, and controversial,116 measure taken by developed countries
in support of tax incentives programs of developing countries to date is their
agreement to include tax sparing provisions in tax treaties that they conclude
115 Regardless of one's opinion about the sufficiency of aid in general.
116 For a comprehensive review of the debate and the important literature, see Brooks, supra
note 15.
2010
U.B.C. LAW REVIEW
with developing countries."7 It is also a popular measure, increasingly so, de-
spite the controversy over its effectiveness and the disfavour of international
organizations. " 8 This popularity has not recently been shared by the most
developed countries, following the expressions of doubts about the desirabil-
ity of tax sparing by the OECD," 9 and famously has never been shared by the
United States.' 2
0
Tax sparing amends the normal foreign tax credit rules to make certain
that tax incentives made by developing countries benefit the foreign investors
that they target, rather than others, allowing these incentives programs a
chance of success. The foreign tax credit rules are a common mechanism to
reduce or eliminate double taxation. The residence country typically allows
its resident taxpayers (the foreign investors) a tax credit (reduction of domes-
tic tax liability dollar-for-dollar) for taxes duly paid by such taxpayers to for-
eign countries (the target countries). It reflects the international convention
that the source country, where business is conducted, gets the first "bite" at
taxing the income from such business, while the residence (of the investor)
country is allowed to further tax such income to the extent that double taxa-
tion does not occur. 2' This residual taxation by the residence country, so
goes the argument, effectively eliminates the efficacy of tax incentives for for-
eign direct investment, since any tax concession by the target (source) coun-
try simply reduces its "first bite" at the income of the foreign investment and
117 For the origins of the practice, see e.g. Stanley S. Surrey, "The Pakistan Tax Treaty and
'Tax Sparing'" (1958) 11 Nat'l TaxJ. 156.
1I See Victor Thuronyi, "Recent Treaty Practice on Tax Sparing" (2003) 29 Tax Notes Int'l
301.
1"9 See OECD, Corporate Tax, supra note 48.
120 See Paul R. McDaniel, "The U.S. Tax Treatment of Foreign Source Income Earned in De-
veloping Countries: A Policy Analysis" (2003) 35 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 265 at 291-
292. For the history of the position, see Richard D. Kuhn, "United States Tax Policy with
Respect to Less Developed Countries" (1963) 32 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 262. See also
Damian Laurey, "Reexamining U.S. Tax Sparing Policy with Developing Countries: The
Merits of Falling in Line with International Norms" (2000) 20 Va. Tax Rev. 467 at 480.
121 The foreign tax credit is capped by the residence country's tax rate for revenue protection
purposes and to ensure that source countries do not take advantage of this mechanism by
maximizing taxation of foreign investors at the expense of the residence country.
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accordingly increases the residual taxation by the residence country. The
benefits of the incentives therefore go to the residence (developed) country
instead of the investors, and consequently tax incentives have no chance of
achieving the goal of incentivizing foreign direct investment. The investors
are at best indifferent to the tax incentives since they face an overall (source
and residence countries combined) identical effective tax rate. Tax sparing
treats developed countries investors who enjoy developing countries' tax con-
cessions as if they actually paid the conceded tax to the developing (source)
country, eliminating, to the extent of the concession, the residual taxing right
of the developed (residence) country.1 22 123
Tax sparing is not always required to preserve tax incentives granted by
target developing countries. If the investor resides, for instance, in a country
that employs an exemption (double taxation relief) system rather than for-
eign tax credits, then there is no residual taxation by the residence (devel-
oped) country and the value of tax incentives is preserved. 124 Some foreign
122 A numeric example may be useful to illustrate this. Assume that a U.S. investor, who faces
a worldwide 35% flat tax rate in the U.S., invests in a foreign country F that taxes foreign
investors at a flat 10% reduced tax rate (from a normal 30%). The investor pays $10 on
$100 of income to country F and $25 ($100x35% - $10 foreign tax credit) to the U.S.
Overall the investor faces a $35 tax, which is the same tax that he would have faced with-
out the concession by country F. Without the concession, the investor pays $30 to coun-
try F and a residual $5 to the U.S. The concession or tax incentive therefore merely trans-
fers revenue from country F to the U.S. and has no impact on the investor (or the invest-
ment). If the US. granted tax sparing in this case, it would have treated the investor as if
she paid $30 (the full/regular tax rate) rather than the actual $10 paid to country F, and
accordingly require the investor to pay only $5 residual tax to the US. With tax sparing,
the investor faces 15% effective tax rather than 35%, the US. collects the same 5% tax it
would normally collect, and the 20% tax concession of country F would be enjoyed by the
person whom it targets (the investor).
123 A similar mechanism that is often mentioned is the matching credit, i.e., the allowance of
a fixed rate of a foreign tax credit regardless of actual taxation or tax rates in the source
countries. This less popular mechanism is typically used in tax treaties and effectively em-
bodies a taxing rights division or tax sharing that is formula-based. See e.g. Convention be-
tween Brazil and the Netherlandsfor theAvoidance ofDouble Taxation and the Prevention
ofFiscalEvasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, 8 March 1990, 1658 U.N.T.S. 202, Art.
23 (entered into force 20 November 2001).
124 See e.g. Brooks, supra note 15.
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investors may not suffer residual residence country taxation because of their
particular tax position: a consequence of excess foreign tax credits or some
sophisticated tax planning. This, however, cannot serve as an argument
against the use of tax sparing since chronic excess credit position does not in-
dicate strength, as is evident by the fact that most United States multina-
tional enterprises have excess limitation positions. Development policy may
not want to encourage foreign direct investment by corporations with excess
credit rather than excess limitation positions. Tax planning that avoids resid-
ual residence country taxation often relies on deferral, i.e., a country's non-
taxation of business income generated by subsidiaries of taxpayers out ofju-
risdiction.'2 s Deferral does not necessarily result in avoidance of the residual
residence country taxation, since eventually when profits, as reinvested, are
repatriated they will suffer similar taxation in present value terms. The
United States rules, however, de facto permit indefinite deferral, which ex-
plains the consistently low effective tax rates that United States multinational
enterprises' foreign source income faces. 126 This means that full residual resi-
dence country tax is not collected and therefore that the value of tax incen-
tives is preserved, at least to a certain extent. 27
Tax sparing is typically granted by developed countries in tax treaties
(with developing countries).'28 Note, however, that if one believes in their de-
sirability there is no reason to limit them to tax treaties.'29 A country may
simply provide for tax sparing in its domestic (unilateral) foreign tax credit
rules. It would require a country to create a list of target countries or maybe
even particular tax incentives that may benefit from the sparing, yet this is
125 This is based on the religious-like adherence to the legal fiction of the corporate separate
legal personality. Most or all countries employ some anti-abuse or anti-deferral rules, such
as the U.S. subpart F rules (see §§ 951-965), yet these rules never apply to genuine in-
come bona fide generated through business activities in the subsidiaries' countries of resi-
dence.
126 See e.g. Martin A. Sullivan, "Economic Analysis: U.S. Multinationals Shifting Profits Out
of the United States" (2008) 118 Tax Notes 1078.
127 This is an important part of the consistent U.S. resistance to grant tax sparing.
128 For a good selective review of the history of tax sparing, see Brooks, supra note 15.
129 See generally David R. Tillinghast, "Tax Treaty Issues" (1996) 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 455 at
475, n. 99 and accompanying text.
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not extraordinarily exceptional: countries often use black and white lists in
their domestic tax laws. Such an approach would better reflect a commit-
ment to tax sparing as a desirable policy device and allow a country to use it
in cases of countries with which the conclusion of a tax treaty may not be
probable for reasons independent of development issues. Research of the
practice of tax sparing does not reveal, to the best of my knowledge, any give-
and-take involved in the inclusion of tax sparing in treaties between devel-
oped and developing countries,' 30 so the treaty context is not justifiable. Fur-
thermore, to the best of my knowledge, no country has conducted follow-up
studies to assess the efficacy of tax sparing, augmenting the conclusion that it
is probably considered mainly an altruistic (conscience cleaning) mechanism
rather than a true treaty measure. 3 ' The conclusion of tax treaties between
developed and developing countries itself may be important for development
independently of the tax sparing debate, and therefore will be discussed sepa-
rately below.
The design of tax sparing provisions may also carry importance. In reality,
however, provisions are quite similar despite the fact that they are among the
very few provisions in tax treaties that do not follow a "model" (the tax treaty
models do not include tax sparing). One design issue relates to the type of
income protected by the provision-passive or active. There is no reason to
distinguish between the two unless one wishes to promote only foreign di-
rect investment. In practice the distinction is relevant to countries that use an
exemption for one type of income (often, active income) and a credit for the
other, a non-substantive distinction.'32 Another non-substantive distinction
is between individual and corporate taxpayers, excluding the former, possibly
for anti-abuse reasons.'33 Similarly, abuse concerns lead countries to some-
times refer to specific tax incentives when they grant tax sparing.' 4 A more
serious distinction is the time limitation on tax sparing: some articles are
general, and some have sunset provisions, yet in reality these often are ex-
130 This may not be true in treaties between developing countries.
131 See also OECD, Tax Sparing: A Reconsideration (Paris: OECD Publishing, 1998).
132 See Brooks, supra note 15.
133 See ibid. at 20-21.
134 See ibid. at 21-22.
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tended.'35 The OECD survey reviews these design issues and suggests "best
practices," which focus on abuse concerns. 1 6 For the purposes of this article
two aspects may be interesting: the suggestion not to extend tax sparing to
passive income or to export-oriented business.
3 7
The notable U.S. opposition to tax sparingstems primarily from two con-
cerns: a concern about implementing foreign aid programs in a non-
transparent manner through the tax system and its stark departure from the
usual foreign tax credit policy.'38 The former is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle; the latter, however, is very relevant for its purposes.3 9 The foreign tax
135 See ibid. at 22-23.
136 For an analysis of design issues and the OECD suggestions, see OECD, Tax Sparing, su-
pra note 131 at 24-28.
137 See ibid. at 41- 4 3.
138 Another critical element in the tax sparingdebate is the role of multinational enterprises.
On one hand, developing countries suggest that they are pressured by multinational en-
terprises to grant tax incentives and demand tax sparing from developed countries and the
US. in particular, and on the other hand there is indication that multinational enterprises,
and especially U.S. multinational enterprises understand that the U.S. will not grant tax
sparing and arc not particularly worried about it, so long as a treaty is in place that would
allow them with deferral and additional tax planning to reach a desirable tax position. See
Lee Sheppard & Juliann Martin, "Berman, Part II: Departing U.S. Treasury Staffer Dis-
cusses Treaties" (1997) 15 Tax Notes Int'l 949 at paras. 139-142.
139 See Michael S. Knoll, "International Competitiveness, Tax Incentives, and a New Argu-
ment for Tax Sparing: Preventing Double Taxation by Crediting Implicit Taxes" (Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-21,25 August
2008), online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1259927>. In his article, Professor
Knoll supports tax sparing based on a competitiveness argument. Knoll explains that
countries employing tax incentives replace creditable explicit taxes with non-creditable
(yet effectively deductible) implicit taxes. He argues that tax sparing simply restores the
neutrality between investors from worldwide tax countries and investors from territorial
tax countries when calculated on total (implicit and) explicit tax basis, and if designed
properly is superior to denial of tax sparing also by equalizing taxation of direct and tax
subsidies, and by allowing tax incentives to be more effective. Knoll relies on two studies
of tax sparing. The first, by James R. HinesJr., "Tax Sparing and Direct Investment in De-
veloping Countries" (NBER Working Paper No. 6728, 1998), online: SSRN <http://
ssrn.com/abstract= 129468>, compared investment by US. and Japanese firms in 1990 in
countries with whichJapan had tax sparing arrangements. It found thatJapanese firms in-
vested relatively more and were subject to lower effective taxation in countries with which
Japan had tax sparing arrangements. Similarly to Knoll's article, this study does not say
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that tax sparing assists developing countries in their development but rather is concerned
with the success and effective foreign taxation of U.S. multinational enterprises. There-
fore, it is not very helpful for our purposes, yet one may note that this is a limited study
that does not take into account aspects like the overall taxation level and alternative tax
planning opportunities and limitation for Japanese and U.S. multinational enterprises.
Moreover, other factors may also explain the allegedly better market position oftheJapa-
nese firms, and more importantly, maybe U.S. firms were able to find better yields regard-
less of tax incentives by the countries dominated by the Japanese multinational enter-
prises. Another study by Celine Azemar & Andrew Delios, "Tax Sparing Provision Influ-
ence: A Credit versus Exempt Investor Analysis" (University of Glasgow, Department of
Economics Working PaperJuly 2007), online: University of Glasgow <http://www.gla
.ac.uk/media/media_44476_en.pdf>, follows Hines' study with a more substantial ten
year data set comparingJapanese multinational enterprises with French multinational en-
terprises that are subject to an exemption system. It concludes that tax sparing provisions
affected location decisions of the Japanese firms, while not affecting the French multina-
tional enterprises. Further they affected FDI decisions and had no effect on pas-
sive/portfolio earnings. The article appropriately cautions that it does not provide a con-
clusion about the overall desirability of tax sparing, and obviously it does not provide any
insight into the desirability of tax incentives used by developing countries other than the
conclusion that tax sparing is not completely ineffective for FDI from worldwide tax ju-
risdictions. This study is not very helpful therefore for our purposes, yet one should note
that there is a possibility that tax sparing is granted in response to particular pressures by
multinational enterprises in developed countries (Japan here), which would make the cau-
sation questionable (i.e. it is possible that the most desirable location was determined first
and only then a pressure on both target and residence jurisdictions came about). Overall,
assessing Knoll's analysis is beyond the scope of this article, because it does not have the
goal of promoting development, but rather promoting competitiveness of U.S. multina-
tional enterprises, yet, I would make a couple of observations since it is so directly related
to an important aspect of this article. First, I do not subscribe to the concern over com-
petitiveness, since it masks efficiency concerns, but in a distortive way. See e.g. DonaldJ.
Marples, "Taxes and International Competitiveness" (CRS Report RS22445, 11 March
2008). More competitive multinational enterprises do not mean a more efficient U.S.
economy or a welfare increase for its constituency. The interests of U.S. multinational en-
terprises are not necessarily identical to the interest of the U.S. and the American people.
Second, our tax system does not tax implicit taxes that are apparent in various other cir-
cumstances, and therefore taking it into account in this context potentially reduces the ef-
fective tax on foreign investment in countries granting tax incentives. The use of double
taxation as an excuse here is problematic. First, indeed the international tax regime is
based on the single tax principle, yet this single tax clearly refers to a post-realization (ex-
plicit) tax, not all taxes however defined. Second, the single tax principle is a framework
for division of revenue among countries, and rates may still vary freely, excluding implicit
taxes universally. Inclusion of implicit taxes by one country should not necessarily im-
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credit has always been considered an extraordinary benefit to taxpayers,
granted by the United States in support of its rhetoric about adherence to
capital export neutrality. As an extraordinary benefit, it should be granted
only to taxpayers that are targeted by the benefit and that are in full compli-
ance with its conditions. The United States does not view itself as conceding
the right of primary taxation of income sourced outside its jurisdiction, but
rather as granting relief to its own taxpayers who suffer foreign taxation ac-
ceptable under universal norms. This relief does not create a right for the
source country, and definitely not an exclusive right to tax the income of the
United States taxpayer. The current international tax regime is not in its basis
a revenue or tax base dividing regime but rather a taxation ordering regime.
Therefore, the source (developing) country in our context has no exclusive
right to the tax base, as may be implicitly signalled by tax sparing. It simply
has the right to tax the income domestically sourced, to tax it first in order
and to tax it at whatever tax rate it determines for the particular type of in-
come-reduced or not. Note that this is a very fundamental aspect of our
current international tax regime that is based at its very core on non-
cooperation and non-sharing, though there are very loose, decentralized co-
ordination conventions. One alternative regime has been, interestingly, at the
center of the tax discourse lately: a switch to a formula based system would
potentially result in a tax base sharing mechanism that would be much more
receptive to mechanisms such as tax sparing, since it could grant countries
exclusive rights to tax or not to tax certain incomes. A critical point about
this issue is that only enhanced international cooperation and coordination
of tax policies could advance tax sparing like mechanisms that would be ac-
ceptable as the high road rather than as an altruist peculiarity. This is one
demonstration of the desirability of enhanced cooperation for developing
countries.
In conclusion, there is little support to a contention that tax sparing in its
current format is effective as a supporting device for developing countries' tax
incentives, and there is virtually no evidence or even studies that test this
contention. Countries who grant tax incentives generally treat them as for-
prove efficiency. It would more probably result in more complexity and distortions intro-
duced to the system. Finally, further study is required for a good assessment of the bene-
fits and costs of universally taxing implicit taxes on cross-border transactions.
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eign aid and as part of their treaty policy rather than as well targeted tax pol-
icy mechanisms. No studies have attempted a cost benefits analysis of tax
sparing of any kind to the best of my knowledge.
A related, yet different question relates to the choice of double tax relief
mechanism and its effect on development. Professor Karen Brown suggested
that moving to an exemption system would be beneficial to United States in-
vestment in developing countries and particularly in Africa, since it would
lead to enhanced effectiveness of developing countries' tax incentives' pro-
grams. 40 Professor Paul McDaniel responded that a similar result may be
achieved through corrections made to our foreign tax credit rules, and that it
is not clear that a complete or partial switch would indeed enhance invest-
ment in developing countries in general and in African countries in particu-
lar."' Beyond this particular debate, the choice between an exemption and a
credit system involves a large variety of aspects, including a heated debate
over the relative costs of the two systems. In any event there seems to be little
evidence that a complete switch to an exemption system would benefit de-
veloping countries or United States investment in such countries. A deeper
analysis of this point may be a worthy future project. Next, the more general
question of the benefits of concluding tax treaties between developed and
developing countries is picked up.
2. TAx TREATIES BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
A large network of (largely) bilateral tax treaties constructs the current inter-
national tax regime. 14 2 Almost all of them closely follow the OECD model
140 See Karen B. Brown, "Transforming the Unilateralist into the Internationalist: New Tax
Treaty Policy Towards Developing Countries" in Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fallows,
eds., Taxing America (New York: New York University Press, 1996); Karen B. Brown,
'Missing Africa, Should U.S. International Tax Rules Accommodate Investment in De-
veloping Countries?" (2002) 23 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 45. See also Karen B. Brown,
"Harmful Tax Competition: The OECD View" (1999) 32 Geo. Wash.J. Int'l L. & Econ.
311.
141 See McDaniel, supra note 120.
142 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as InternationalLaw (NewYork: Cambridge
University Press, 2007).
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convention, yet some treaties follow a competing model convention, known
as the United Nations model. The United Nations model was initially pub-
lished in 1980, with a recent revision in 200 1.11 The United Nations model
attempts to accommodate the needs of developing countries that conclude
tax treaties with developed countries primarily by allowing additional taxa-
tion at source, i.e., to the developing countries. 44 Otherwise, it practically
clones the OECD model and its language, and at least in the last two decades
the United Nations model has been marginalized. Actual tax treaties follow
the OECD model more closely. Developing countries, therefore, failed to
follow the United Nations' model, and, so to speak, "make it their own." This
may be because they did not have the power to compel their developed coun-
try treaty partners to accept its premises, or may be because they were not
convinced that the model treaty was in their best interest. Another problem
is that increased taxation at source may be counterproductive to developing
countries that attempt to attract investment. Taxation at source may be an
unrecoverable cost for investors, or it may increase the effective tax rate they
face. 4 It may be the case that the only way source countries can benefit from
rights to increase taxation at source is through cooperative action.'46 This has
wider implications, and will be discussed further in the concluding section,
yet there is another, more specific question here: Is the conclusion of bilateral
143 See UN, United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and
Developing Countries (New York: United Nations Publications, 2001), online: UN
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NOO/676/65/PDF/NO067665 
.pdf?
OpenElement>.
144 In addition to the model, the United Nations has stepped up its efforts in the tax area re-
cently. See e.g. UN, "Financing for Development", online: UN <http://www.un.org/esa/
ffd/tax/>. It even published a Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties
between DevelopedandDeveloping Countries (New York: United Nations, 2003), online:
UN <http://unpan 1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/JNPANO08579
.pdf>.
145 This may be because ofinsufficient foreign source income to allow full foreign tax credit
recovery, a real loss position, or an effective tax rate at source that exceeds the investor's ef-
fective worldwide tax rate.
146 See e.g. Margalioth, supra note 61.
VOL. 42:2
A FRAMEWORK FOR AN INFORMED STUDY
tax treaties is helpful for developing countries in their quest for develop-
ment?
4 7
Currently, there is very little research of this question, and particularly lit-
tle evidence exists to answer it specifically for developing countries. A study
of United States foreign direct investment did not find evidence that bilateral
tax treaties increase investment, but rather found economically and statisti-
cally significant negative effects of new bilateral tax treaties on United States
outbound activity to the tax treaty partner country, concluding that the pri-
mary role of tax treaties is to combat tax evasion. 4 A follow up paper sug-
gested that even renegotiation of tax treaties did not result in a robust posi-
tive impact on foreign direct investment.'49 A more recent and wider in scope
study used data of bilateral OECD outward foreign direct investment be-
tween 1985 and 2000, and found a significant negative impact of newly im-
plemented tax treaties on outward foreign direct investment stocks. 150 Fi-
nally, the most recent study found slightly more positive results. It found evi-
dence that middle-income developing countries that have signed a treaty
with the United States or a higher number of tax treaties with important
capital exporters actually do receive more foreign direct investment from the
147 This is particularly interesting because the more preliminary question ofwhy do countries
conclude tax treaties at all has not been answered conclusively. The main challenge to the
need for tax treaties is Tsilly Dagan's"The Tax Treaties Myth" (2000) 32 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L.
& Pol. 939. It is quite clear that the stated goal of elimination of double taxation cannot
explain the practice since it is easy to achieve that unilaterally, yet, other aspects explored
in the literature, and especially the "belonging to the club" of cooperative countries aspect
have better explanatory force, which is particularly relevant for developing countries in
our context. See e.g. Yariv Brauner, "An International Tax Regime in Crystallization"
(2003) 56 Tax L. Rev. 259.
148 See Bruce A. Blonigen & Ronald B. Davies,"The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on U.S.
FDI Activity" (University of Oregon, Economics Working Paper No. 2001-14, 1 January
2001), online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=445980>.
149 See Ronald B. Davies, "Tax Treaties, Renegotiations, and Foreign Direct Investment"
(University of Oregon, Economics Working Paper No. 2003-14, June 2003), online:
SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstracr=436502>.
150 See Peter Egger etal., "The Impact of Endogenous Tax Treaties on Foreign Direct In-
vestment: Theory and Evidence" (2006) 39 Canadian Journal of Economics 901.
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United States and in total. However, tax treaties are not useful for low-
income developing countries.'
This gloomy picture is deceiving, however. One should not jump to con-
clusions based on so little and very limited research. This is definitely an area
that requires more attention and analysis. What we could say is that one can-
not automatically argue that tax treaties promote foreign direct investment.
Similarly it cannot be said that developing countries always benefit from tax
treaties they conclude or from adhering to the United Nations model. Fi-
nally, better exploration of the promise to development in international co-
operation and coordination of tax policies is essential to fully answer the
above questions.
3. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, ADVISING, ETC.
Developed countries may also take up what may be viewed as a more proac-
tive role in assisting developing countries to develop. This type of involve-
ment takes various forms. In general, though, the idea is that sometimes
monetary aid or incentives to developing countries are not enough or not ef-
fective: maybe because of the lack of political will or capability to effectively
or efficiently put these to use, or maybe because it is very difficult to buy
what the developing country needs on the market. Support of developed
countries that send their troops of experts (somewhat similarly to military
troops) may be, at times, more effective than sending money.' 2 Technical as-
sistance may be viewed as an "in kind" substitute to aid, so conceptually tax
measures may support it or its fruits similarly to other aid projects. Other,
more particular measures, may also be considered, such as, say, beneficial
treatment of the earnings of the posted experts, whether they work directly
for the posting government or not.
An obvious area where such assistance may be particularly useful is the
design and implementation of a better tax system in developing countries: a
tax system that would not hinder their efforts to develop, and that would be
compatible with the world tax regime. This type of assistance would result in
151 See Eric Neumayer, "Do Double Taxation Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to
Developing Countries?" (2007) 43 Journal of Development Studies 1495.
152 See Collier, supra note 4 at 111-15.
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an environment which is more accommodating for foreign investment, less
costly, and would make it easier for developed countries to use other meas-
ures in support of the developing countries' efforts to develop. Enforcement
may be critical and at times experience in effective enforcement may be more
important than the general design of the system. Signing bilateral tax treaties
is an important first step in the direction of inclusion in the community of
nation states comprising the current international tax regime as have been
explained above, yet, a stable and functioning domestic system is the precon-
dition to any development.
Various efforts, completely independent of tax treaty conclusions, have
been taken by developing countries, their agents, and by international or-
ganizations to advise developing countries about the reform, design and im-
plementation of their tax systems.' These efforts faced two major doubts
regarding their efficacy. First, their intent and sincerity was in question, since
developed countries have interest, and in particular short term interest that
may be in conflict with the development goal of developing countries. Sec-
ond, their usefulness was in question due to the concern that what was per-
ceived as desirable for developed countries may not be desirable for develop-
ing countries, either in principle or in practice because developed countries
and their experts were not familiar enough with the full scale of circum-
stances of the advisee developing countries. This is clearly an area where sys-
tematic study of the theory and practice may be useful. Especially useful may
be an honest study of the truth in the claim that prescriptions do not work in
this context and more specifically whether countries in different stages of de-
velopment (least developed, developed, or emerging) should think differ-
ently about the design of their tax systems. Current scholarship does not
provide much insight on this point,5 4 reflecting almost a disbelief that devel-
oping countries may actually develop.
153 See e.g. Thirsk, supra note 54; Malcolm Gillis, ed., Tax Reform in Developing Countries
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1989); Miranda Stewart, "Global Trajectories of Tax
Reform: Mapping Tax Reform in Developing and Transition Countries" (University of
Melbourne, Public Law Research Paper No. 29,2002), online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=3 19200>; Stewart & Jogarajan, supra note 53.
'54 But see Eric M. Zolt & Richard M. Bird, "Tax Policy in Emerging Countries" (2008) 26
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 73.
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4. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
International organizations played a central role in advising developing coun-
tries about their tax systems. The involvement of the IMF in particular suf-
fered the most heated criticism of the sort mentioned above. The IMF has a
long-standing tax experts group, both on the legal and the economics sides. A
detailed analysis of the IMF's role in the process of use of tax measures by de-
veloping countries is beyond the scope of this article, 5' yet the main criticism
is important to the purposes of this article, since it criticizes the one-size-fits-
all "planner" approach of the IMF that is no different from its general ap-
proach to foreign aid.'5 6 On one hand, the sensibility of this approach has
been and should be further challenged and assessed; on the other hand, the
IMF is a bank, a lending institution with a duty to ensure repayment of the
loans it makes. In this capacity it must at least take into account the interests
of its capital contributors, i.e., the developed countries. It is therefore argua-
bly not fit to serve as a development promotion institution. 57 The problem is
that it is the sole international factor that is engaged in this activity. Assess-
ment of the IMF's proper role and potential alternative arrangements to in-
ternationally support tax reforms in developing countries are other areas
where additional research is required.
155 For the most comprehensive analysis of this involvement, see the work ofStewart &Joga-
rajan, supra note 53; Stewart, supra note 153. For the IMF perspective, see Alan Tait,
"IMF Advice on Fiscal Policy" (IMF Working Paper No. 89/87, 23 October 1989),
online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=885034>; and Vito Tanzi, "The IMF and Tax
Reform" (IMF Working Paper No. 90/39, April 1990), online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=884755>.
156 See Stewart, supra note 153.
157 In fact, the proper roles of the IMF and its charges are hotly debated independently of
their (relatively minor) roles in the context of tax reform. See e.g. Stiglitz, supra note 4;
Martin Feldstein, "Refocusing the IM F" (1998) 77:2 Foreign Affairs 20; Edwin M. Tru-
man, ed., Reformingthe IMFfor the 21st Century (Washington D.C.: Institute for Interna-
tional Economics, 2006); Eric Helleiner & Bessma Momani, "Slipping into Obscurity?
Crisis and Reform at the IMF" (CIGI Working Paper No. 16, February 2007), online:
SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=964915>; Richard Webb & Devesh Kapur, 'Beyond
the IMF" (Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 99, August 2006), online:
SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=982965>.
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5. SPONSOR COUNTRIES
Some country-to-country specific initiatives also took place, yet these were
mostly wider in scope and their tax-related component was just a small part
of an overall assistance effort. In most cases these initiatives were conducted
by former colonial powers in their former colonies.158 A true global solution
should better assess the wisdom of these arrangements.
This section mapped the various ways taken by developed countries to
accommodate developing countries in the field of taxation. It also made some
observations on potential reforms, innovations and, most importantly, issues
that require further study before we can say anything wise about them. The
next sections suggest that one direction that further study can take is to learn
from the more extensive research done in the foreign aid field that may be
useful to our task.
B. LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LITERATURE
Focus on foreign direct investment dictated a focus on tax incentives and tax
sparing by tax experts, practitioners and academics. This, of course, fits also
the concerns of multinational enterprises - the investors-in their attempt to
minimize their costs of investment in (the more risky) developingcountries.
This focus, however, resulted in the neglect of other aspects of the quest of
developing countries and their people for growth and development. Tax-
related issues are naturally minor in the broad scheme of development and
the efforts of developed countries in this context are generally less proactive
than their role in, e.g., aid, technical assistance, etc. Hence, one can find a
much more extensive literature and study of foreign aid in particular. The
question is whether it is possible to learn a lesson from these non tax devel-
opment efforts by developed countries (aid, technical assistance, etc.) that
would assist us in the evaluation of the role of tax in development.
158 See KrisJames Mitchener & Marc D. Weidenmier, "Trade and Empire" (2008) 118:533
EconomicJournal 1805 (An interesting recent study demonstrating generally that origi-
nally belonging to an empire roughly doubled trade relative to those countries that were
not part of an empire. The use of a common language, the establishment of currency un-
ions, the monetization of recently acquired colonies, and the establishment of preferential
trade agreements and customs unions help to account for the observed increase in trade
associated with empire.).
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The centrality of aid to the efforts to promote development is well
documented and extensively researched and discussed. Aid has grown im-
mensely over the years and reached the $100 billion mark in 2005.159 Further,
unprecedented press coverage and celebrity power were recruited to support
and promote aid in the name of development and poverty reduction in par-
ticular.60 Notwithstanding the success in coverage and volume, aid has been
very disappointing in achievements to date.' 6' This article does not partici-
pate in the discourse over the necessity or effectiveness of aid, yet it wishes to
draw from the insights available from its intensive study that may be useful in
the more humble context of development-promoting tax-related measures.
Aid results in infusion of capital of various kinds or knowledge into the
targeted economies. It may fall into the hands of the developing country's
government, particular people or organizations within such countries. Tax
measures do not have to operate only as incentives for foreign direct inves-
tors, and may similarly result in money in the hands of developing countries'
governments or otherwise. The experience of other development efforts may
assist us in studying the potential desirability of these alternative measures, if
any. The first example that comes to mind is the issue of corruption, which is
ubiquitous among developing countries governments. Straightforward aid to
such governments is unlikely to be effective for development, and similarly
tax measures that result only in money at the hands of such governments are
likely to be ineffective and undesirable.
The reality is, however, much more nuanced than this simplistic example.
There is much disagreement among aid experts themselves over the desirabil-
ity of various policies and their implementation. Similarly, the actions of the
major international organizations, such as the IMF, the World Bank, the
United Nations, USAID, and other governmental and non-governmental
159 For an extensive statistics, see e.g. OECD, Aid Statistics, supra note 3.
160 U2's Bono even wrote the introduction to the economist Jeffrey Sachs popular book, The
End ofPoverty. See Sachs, supra note 3. See also Edward Schwerin, "Celebrity Activism:
Can Bono, Bill, and Jeffrey Save Africa?" (Paper presented at the ISA's 49th Annual Con-
vention, Bridging Multiple Divides, San Francisco, 26 March 2008), online: All Academic
<http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p25429 
_index.html>.
161 See William R. Easterly, "Introduction: Can't Take it Anymore?" in Easterly, Reinventing
Foreign Aid, supra note 4, 1 at 2.
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organizations are challenged. The primary focus of these organizations has
been central planning and generally free market philosophy, even when these
two were difficult to reconciled, and obviously not compatible. The general
response of these organizations and their sponsors, the developed countries,
has been to admit failure, yet promise that current and future plans will be
much better than past failing plans and therefore require more funding that
would guarantee success. They ride mainly the argument that aid is required
to overcome a poverty trap-people in developing countries are too poor to
save and invest, so they are stuck in decline without hope, and aid could lift
them above mere subsistence and release their entrepreneurial and growth
powers. 62 Alas, this promising theory has no strong support in research and
indeed its bearers consistently fail in implementing their own plans. 63
A competing philosophy called these organizations to admit the failure of
central planning and grand goals, and replace them with assistance to what
Professor William Easterly, a leading figure in this critical group, calls
"searchers', in contrast to "planners";'; 6 those who search for successful,
maybe smaller scale projects, yet projects whose success may be accurately de-
fined and measured. Searchers may not be able to revolutionize and turn
around countries suffering from years of deprivation, yet they do lead to pro-
gress, a claim that traditional aid organizations cannot make. This approach
emphasizes the role of the people of developing countries in helping them-
selves and their countries, and the power of foreigners to potentially support
and fortify these entrepreneurial forces. Note that there is a difference in
scale between these approaches, yet searchers' successes may be scaled up, yet
it is impossible to plan ahead what would work. First, claims Easterly, one
must search for it, and then maybe planning may help in scaling it up; this
process cannot work in a different order.' 6 ' This criticism of the current
framework goes back to the very origins of the central planning attitude to-
wards foreign aid.
162 See e.g. Sachs, supra note 3.
163 See citations in Easterly, Reinventing Foreign Aid, supra note 4 at 14-15.
164 See e.g. Easterly, White Mans Burden, supra note 5 at 3-36.
165 See Easterly, Reinventing Foreign Aid, supra note 4 at 9.
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The role of government and its quality is very important to the debate,
since the plans of planners are difficult to implement in countries with bad
governments, whereas searchers may still operate in such countries and ac-
count for these difficulties. The debate then turns to political questions, for-
eign policy and human rights issues, and the definition of potentially well
governed states, which meddles with the focus of the debate. We have men-
tioned the importance of institutions and corruption for growth, so clearly
their research will be relevant to new approaches to the design of tax meas-
ures in support of growth and development.
The stakes are so high and the uncertainties in research are so prevalent
that it is safe to say that the debate will persist, yet one avenue of tax-relevant
potential action may emerge: developed countries are clearly in a position to
support searchers in their searches, and tax incentives could be uniquely
suited to be successful in that: they support only successful searches, they
provide information, and are possibly capable of measuring accomplish-
ments. They also do not directly fund corrupt regimes, although this is some-
thing to be concerned about (corrupt rulers rather than searchers and entre-
preneurs taking advantage of it). This is a direction that would be almost en-
tirely new, although to some extent a similar approach is taken in the conclu-
sion of tax treaties between developed and developing countries, yet treaties
are not well-tuned mechanisms for such a task.
Note that the debate between planners and searchers is important and
that operations in both modes do not result in synergies and benefit from the
combination, because planners dominate the money and they crowd out
searching efforts and contradict the patient approach that searching re-
quires.' 6 Searching by definition cannot promise results and cannot be
planned with particular goals, yet promises and goals have led to little pro-
gress so maybe it is worth it trying another approach that research finds to be
at least successful as an approach. No elixirs can be aspired to, yet an under-
standing of what type of actions may assist development may assist us in the
tax world to make sure that our policies at least do not hinder such actions
and hopefully also are able to support them. It seems not to be the case that
166 See ibid. at 24.
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uncertainty about the economics of development prevents us developed
countries from taking any action.167
The foreign aid discourse is more complex then the "searchers versus
planners" dichotomy. Future study of the lesson we should take from the aid
literature must include other approaches. For example, Professor Paul Col-
lier, who in a way takes a middle ground in the debate, appreciating the im-
portance of aid on one hand, yet criticizing the development policies taken
by the international community,168 takes the position that focusing on the
poverty trap and attempting to eliminate it with aid alone may be pointless.
This is because there are many other reasons, or even traps that stop the
poorest countries from developing. He mentions especially the conflict trap
(internal turmoil and coups), the natural resources trap (or "curse" as it is
commonly described), the geographical limitations of countries landlocked
while having "bad" neighbours and bad governance (corruption, lawlessness)
in small countries.169 Then, Collier matches five primary instruments-aid,
military intervention, regulation, laws and charters, and trade policy-that
may serve as solutions to these limitations, or traps. 17 He demonstrates how
different poor countries face a mix of different traps or challenges, and there-
fore should benefit from different mixes of instruments to support their at-
tempt to get out of poverty.17" ' In particular, he emphasizes the potential role
of the G8 in the solution, 172 yet for our purposes it is important to follow his
methodology and manner of thinking about development and think what
tax measures could support such an effort, if any.
In conclusion, legal tax scholarship should follow the developments in
the economic development literature in general and the aid literature in par-
ticular in its attempts to design tax measures to support the general initia-
tives. Unfortunately, there has been little to no work done in this area to date.
167 For additional ideas, see ibid. at 37-38.
168 See Collier, supra note 4.
169 See ibid. at Part 2.
170 See ibid. at Part 4.
71 See ibid.
172 See ibid. at 175-92.
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Such future research should fit generally into the measures taken by devel-
oped countries in support of the development of developing countries.
In order to seriously tackle the question of the appropriate role of devel-
oped countries in this process one must confront the questions of interest, re-
sponsibility and commitment. Part of this commitment may include revision
of the international tax norms that construct the current world tax regime:
base splitting, formulary apportionment, revenue sharing and a more dy-
namic approach (also relevant to new tax treaties' framework). However,
probably the most important step should be to embrace productive progress
in international cooperation and coordination of tax polices that simply can-
not be made without the assistance, or, more realistically, the leadership of
developed countries. Next, the article concludes with a particular focus on
the role of international cooperation.
IV. CONCLUSION: (HOW) COULD A STRONGER
INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME (AND A REALITY CHECK)
PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT?
The goal of this workshop was to jumpstart the legal academic discourse
about the relationship between development and taxation. This article at-
tempted to map the issues, that could use further study and analysis (namely,
alas, all relevant issues). The article constructs a framework for the discussion
of the relevant issues, some of which are obvious and even extensively ana-
lyzed, studied and debated, such as tax holidays and tax sparing, and some of
which have been completely ignored. All of them, however, require rigorous
theoretical and empirical study that is sometimes difficult to conduct because
of its strong political implications. Nonetheless, it is clear that piecemeal, tax
technical analysis of the various measures discussed in this article is of little
use if it were not part of a comprehensive, coherent and systematic approach
to the relationship between taxation and development; an approach that fol-
lows a relatively clear goal of promoting development.
An educated, comprehensive approach does not mean that it cannot be
pluralistic. It does mean, however, that clear goals, success measurement and
accountability standards must be accepted and followed. It also means that
some level of coordination should be at the center of the inevitably interna-
tional effort. The desirable level or manner of coordination or cooperation
should be left for future discussion, yet some of the potential merits of a co-
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operative approach, or how a stronger international tax regime could pro-
mote development, may be pointed out.
Cooperation presents an opportunity to directly confront (harmful) tax
competition, and most obviously stop the snowball effect of continually de-
creasing tax rates that foreign investors face in target developing countries.
This does not mean that they will be able to impose high tax rates on foreign
investors, but that they can collect "some" revenue that is duly theirs under
the current international tax consensus. 173 Moreover, this does not mean the
end of tax incentives; in fact, this is the only way to make tax incentives effec-
tive. Tax incentives could then be set at more appropriate levels (just enough
to offset the increased risk of investing in a developing country, maybe)
rather than race to the bottom zero rates, and they could be diversified to re-
flect idiosyncrasies of the different economies with less concern about "beg-
gar-your-neighbour" type of behaviour. Finally, productive developing coun-
tries will need to worry less about competingwith tax havens, especially since
this is a concern that is common to them and the developed countries, which
should make a cooperation effort in that direction more likely to succeed. In
conclusion, cooperation may allow developing countries to retake control
over the use and design of tax incentives. Note, however, that there will be a
price to pay, as cooperation means that cooperating countries will not be
completely free to do whatever they wish to do. The research of the benefits
of cooperation and the design of workable limitations into a cooperative re-
gime are the first major areas where research is required.
Other issues that demand further research if we were to seriously attempt
to incorporate tax measures into development policy were exposed in the ar-
ticle. First, we must better understand and keep up with the evolving eco-
nomic research about the relationship between foreign direct investment and
economic growth. Such understanding will allow us to limit the use of tax
incentives only to circumstances where they have a chance of achieving their
goals. Furthermore, it can provide us with insight into better design of tax
incentives. Second, the next link in the chain: the relationship between tax
incentives and foreign direct investment has been studied to some extent, yet
173 I.e. that countries where business takes place may tax the income it generates at reasonable
rates so long as it is not discriminative.
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very little information is available in this context from developing countries.
Empirical study of this data is particularly challenging due to the lack of in-
terest among those who may be able to collect the information, namely the
governments. Nonetheless, international cooperation may provide enough
incentives to these governments, and supplement collected information with
data on the investors side to reach more informed conclusions that will allow
us to choose to implement only tax incentives that have a chance of boosting
desirable investment (as identified in the above mentioned line of study). A
third area where almost no research exists is tax sparing. We essentially know
nothing about the effectiveness of this measure that is advertised as a neces-
sary complement to tax incentives implemented by developing countries. We
only have rhetoric; it is time for some facts and clear statements of why we do
what we do.
As mentioned in the discussion of tax sparing, it is not only its ineffec-
tiveness that generated resistance. Partly, it was its incompatibility with the
current paradigms on which our current international tax regime relies. In
particular, the use of formulas to divide revenue among competing tax juris-
dictions, which is essentially what tax sparing is all about, is not an idea
unique to the context of this article. Several scholars have advocated the use
of formulae in one manner or another in core (and usually more important)
areas of international tax law, such as taxation of cross border business 74 and
transfer pricing. 75 This and other changes of paradigms also fit into the for-
merly discussed apparent need to increase international cooperation in the
174 See e.g. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & K.A. Clausing, "Reforming Corporate Taxation in a
Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment" in Jason Furman &
Jason Bordoff, eds., Path to Prosperity: Hamilton Project Ideas on Income Security, Educa-
tion, and Taxes (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008).
175 See e.g. Louis M. Kauder, "Intercompany Pricing and Section 482: A Proposal to Shift
from Uncontrolled Comparables to Formulary Apportionment Now" (1993) 58 Tax
Notes 485; Paul R. McDaniel, "Formulary Taxation in the North American Free Trade
Zone: A Policy Perspective" (1994) 49 Tax L. Rev. 69; Walter Hellerstein, "International
Income Allocation in the Twenty-first Century: The Case for Formulary Apportion-
ment" (2005) 12 International Transfer PricingJournal 103; Yariv Brauner, "Value in the
Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles for Transfer Pricing Purposes" (2008)
28 Va. Tax Rev. 79.
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field of taxation, since without it, an effective fundamental reform of the in-
ternational tax regime may not be realistic.
Finally, and no less importantly, is the need to learn from the economic
development literature and particularly the aid literature about possible roles
for developed countries in the process beyond tax sparing and traditional tax
incentives. The poorest countries use the same tax incentives that more de-
veloped or developing countries use in the competitive global market for in-
vestment. Yet, we already know that usually they have no chance of becoming
a factor in this market without "something else; or some help. Indeed, they
remain poor. Therefore maybe both developing and developed countries can
design tax incentives with a direct focus on their contribution to specific
goals of development. This ties into the aid discourse and particularly to a
non-centralistic approach that advocates support of domestic entrepreneur-
ship, in a patient, trial and error manner rather than central planning and
panaceas that dominated development policy to date with little success. An-
other attraction of this alternative approach is that it allows developed coun-
tries to help even when support of the developing countries' governments
seems unproductive, such as in cases of corruption, etc. Maybe tax incentives
granted by developed countries that will allow developing countries' entre-
preneurs easier penetration of developed markets or access to technology
may prove more productive than current efforts.
Of course, all of these ideas should be developed further based on future
research and much more empirical study and data that are simply unavailable
at the present. Further, there are issues and challenges that were just briefly
mentioned in the article or not at all. The purpose of this article was to erect
the first foundations for a framework of serious study of the issues at the in-
tersection of taxation and economic development.
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